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This Article reviews federal and (especially) state antitrust
enforcement in light of the Microsoft proceeding. Criticism of state
enforcement based on that case is misplaced. The Article identifies
three consensus comparative advantages of state enforcers: familiarity
with local and regional markets, closeness to state and local
institutions, and ability and experience in compensating individuals. A
review of state enforcement activities finds that the vast majority are
consistent with one or more of these advantages. The Article also
identifies hallmarks of generally accepted federal civil non-merger
enforcement: both antitrust agencies participate actively, using a
variety of tools, while showing support for mainstream, economics-
based antitrust and an interest in addressing important questions,
litigating, and addressing legal issues arising in private as well as
public cases. These factors are considered through review of the
agencies’ role in addressing the appropriate application of the per se
rule, the rule of reason, and mid-level review. The Article ends with
modest recommendations. Enforcers should continue to use their
array of powers, they should address systemic issues in the antitrust
system, and they should apologize less. State enforcers, in particular,
need to do a better job of helping observers understand what they
actually do—which is something on which state enforcers are
working, and something to which this Article may contribute.
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INTRODUCTION
State and federal antitrust enforcement are perceived differently.
State antitrust enforcement is viewed as the new kid on the block, is
less understood, and is more controversial.1 In contrast, federal
antitrust enforcement has achieved widespread acceptance and
support.2
Overly influenced by the aberrant Microsoft case,3 commentators
have misconstrued the roles that state and federal antitrust
enforcement officers play.4 This Article seeks to correct these
misunderstandings. Part I identifies three consensus comparative
advantages of state enforcers: familiarity with local and regional
markets, closeness to state and local institutions, and ability and
experience in compensating individuals. A review of state antitrust
enforcement shows that the vast majority of activities (unlike
Microsoft) are consistent with one or more of these comparative
advantages.
Part II then examines federal antitrust enforcement practices.
Federal antitrust enforcement enjoys such sweeping comparative
advantages—especially in criminal and merger enforcement—that
there is little point in cataloguing them. Instead, this Article identifies
hallmarks of generally accepted, civil, non-merger enforcement: (1)
both the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division (Division) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) participate actively, (2) using a
variety of tools, while (3) showing support for mainstream,
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 281–82 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW] (calling for states to be stripped of most of their authority to file
antitrust cases); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940
(2001) [hereinafter Posner, New Economy] (same).
2. See, e.g., The State of Federal Antitrust Enforcement—2001: Report of the Task Force on
the Federal Antitrust Agencies, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 10, 14–19 [hereinafter ABA
Antitrust Report] (calling for increased resources for federal agencies, and noting that “there is
broad consensus today on the major outlines of appropriate antitrust policies”), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/antitrustenforcement.pdf. But cf. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., FTC
Screams for Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A19 (mocking FTC merger investigation
and claiming that “the problem with the FTC can be stated . . . simply: [i]t exists”).
3. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002) (modifying a
monopolization settlement approved over objections of non-settling states). See infra notes 55–
65 and accompanying text.
4.  See supra note 1.
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economics-based antitrust and an interest in addressing important
questions, (4) litigating, (5) and addressing legal issues arising in
private as well as public cases. As an illustration of how these factors
work, the Article reviews the agencies’ role in addressing the
appropriate application of the per se rule, the rule of reason, and mid-
level review. The agencies’ attempt at addressing these issues is a
singularly challenging enterprise yet one where the agencies, in spite
of their failure to achieve ultimate resolution, are nevertheless seen as
playing responsible roles.
The Article ends with modest recommendations. Enforcers
should continue to use their array of powers, they should address
systemic issues in the antitrust system, and they should apologize less.
State enforcers, in particular, need to do a better job of helping
observers understand what they actually do—which is something on
which state enforcers are working, and something to which this
Article may contribute.
I.  STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
The Microsoft case has been a mixed blessing for the states.5
Thanks to that case, everyone knows that the states are major players
on the antitrust scene. But that case has also brought the role of state
enforcers to the attention of persons—most notably Judge Posner6—
who are displeased with it. In fact, however, critics are attacking
something of a shadow. If one were to list generally accepted
comparative advantages enjoyed by state enforcers, one would find
that the bulk of state enforcement fits comfortably within the bounds
of those advantages.
A. Overview of State Antitrust Enforcement
Although antitrust law as a subject refers principally to federal
statutes—the Sherman Act7 and the Clayton Act,8 supplemented by
the Federal Trade Commission Act9—state antitrust enforcement
predates the oldest of those acts.10 Indeed, Senator Sherman declared
5. The Microsoft case is discussed infra at notes 55–65 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 1.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2000), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2000).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–77 (2000).
10. David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 141 (1990). State
antitrust enforcement is well chronicled in A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 15,
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that a purpose of the act that bears his name was “to supplement the
enforcement of” state laws.11 In the early years, state enforcement
rivaled federal enforcement in terms of numbers of cases and
monetary recoveries.12
After a half-century of relative inactivity, state antitrust
enforcement was revived in 1976. That was the year that the Crime
Control Act13 sent antitrust enforcement seed money to the states14
and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act15 directed the Justice Department
(DOJ) to share investigative information with state attorneys general
and authorized state attorneys general to enforce the Sherman Act
with parens patriae treble damages actions on behalf of state
residents.16 A score of states adopted modernized antitrust statutes
throughout the 1970s, and many states used their seed money to
establish antitrust divisions or units.17 When, during the Reagan years,
states perceived that the federal government was slacking in antitrust
enforcement, the states became a force with which to be reckoned.18
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: THE ROLE OF STATE LAW (1988); 1 A.B.A. SECTION OF
ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 803–34 (5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS]; A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE
AND STATUTES (2d ed. 1999); ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE (Robert L. Hubbard &
Pamela Jones eds., 2d ed. 2002).
11. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
12. See James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495,
500–02 (1987) (describing that, between 1890 and 1902, twelve states brought twenty-eight
antitrust actions while the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought nineteen antitrust suits, and
that Texas collected over $1.6 million in fines in one pre-1919 case while total fines in all federal
antitrust actions prior to 1919 were less than $800,000).
13. Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3701–96c (2000)).
14. Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 116, 90 Stat. 2415 (1976) (omitted by general revision, 1969).
15. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c, 15f (2000); see Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the
Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State
Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 376–91 (1999) (describing the history and
implementation of statutory parens patriae authority).
17. See Ralph H. Folsom, State Antitrust Remedies: Lessons from the Laboratories, 35
ANTITRUST BULL. 941, 950, 955 (1990) (describing the role of federal funding and passage of
modern state antitrust statutes).
18. See Kevin J. O’Connor, Federalist Lessons for International Antitrust Convergence, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 421 (2002) (“In reaction to federal retrenchment, the states became much
more active in enforcing state and federal antitrust laws . . . .”); Jay L. Himes, Exploring the
Antitrust Operating System: State Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law in the Remedies Phase of
the Microsoft Case, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (“This [state antitrust
enforcement] expansion continued during the Reagan Era in response to what many perceived
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Today, every state (and the District of Columbia) has some kind
of antitrust law,19 although the courts of many states rely on federal
antitrust jurisprudence to construe most of these provisions. State
statutes usually allow the state attorney general to file civil or
criminal suits and permit private suits for damages and injunctions.20
State attorneys general also may file federal antitrust suits, because
states and their political subdivisions are “persons” for those
purposes.21
Of particular importance, states can file federal parens patriae
suits on behalf of natural persons seeking monetary relief for
violations of the Sherman Act, and can recover treble damages plus
attorneys fees.22 The effect of this authorization was undermined for a
time by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,23 which prevented federal
lawsuits (including parens patriae suits) by most indirect purchasers.24
Illinois Brick does not apply to litigation invoking state law,25
however, and states quickly assembled an array of “Illinois Brick
repealer” statutes that allowed indirect purchasers to invoke state law
or have it invoked for them.26 Either through “repealer” statutes or
through state consumer protection and unfair trade practices statutes,
more than 70% of Americans can have claims for indirect antitrust
to be a sharp decline in antitrust enforcement at the federal level.”). For a contemporary view,
see Symposium, Current Trends in State Antitrust Enforcement, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 97, 99
(1987).
19. State statutes are reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 30,202.03–35,585 (2003).
20. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 812–13. A directory of state
antitrust officials is available at Directory of Antitrust Officials, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
8905 (May 7, 2003).
21. See Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (“Georgia, suing for her own injuries,
is a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 16 of the Clayton Act . . . .”); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (“The city was a person [and] was [i]njured in
its property . . . by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe.”).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (2000). Congress authorized these suits in part in response to
California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), which held that a state may not sue as
parens patriae on behalf of citizen-consumers injured by antitrust violations, id. at 775. See H.R.
REP. NO. 94-499, pt. 1, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2574–75 (“In large part,
H.R. 8532 is a response to that case and a recognition that the consuming public currently has
no effective means of obtaining compensation for its injuries.”).
23. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
24. Id. at 736, 747 n.31 (rejecting argument that parens patriae authority made suits by
indirect purchasers manageable).
25. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101–04 (1989) (holding that state
indirect purchaser statutes were not preempted).
26. Kevin J. O’Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001,
at 34–35.
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injuries advanced under state law.27 Moreover, Illinois Brick also has
no applicability to lawsuits seeking injunctive relief under section 16
of the Clayton Act28—and it has long been established that a state can
obtain injunctive relief as parens patriae for actual or threatened harm
to its general economy.29
In 1983, the National Association of Attorneys General Antitrust
Committee took an important step by creating the Multistate
Antitrust Task Force.30 Whereas the Antitrust Committee is
comprised of attorneys general, the Task Force is a staff-level
committee.31 The Task Force drafts guidelines and amicus briefs and
coordinates multistate investigations and litigation.32 (For simplicity,
this Article will use “NAAG” to refer to the efforts of the attorneys
general working together under the auspices of their National
Association, but the reference will usually be to the work of the Task
Force.)
B. The States’ Comparative Advantages
The most accepted roles for the states are ones derived from the
states’ comparative advantages.33 Three advantages stand out:
familiarity with local markets, familiarity with and representation of
state and local institutions, and ability to send money to injured
individuals.34
27. Id. at 34; ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 811–12; see also FTC v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–10 (D.D.C. 1999) (reinstating attorneys general claims for
equitable remedies such as restitution, and sometimes damages, for more than a dozen states).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (“Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to
sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of antitrust laws . . . .”); see, e.g., In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 399–400 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Indirect purchaser
status . . . is not fatal to a plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton
Act.”).
29. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261–65 (1972) (holding that the Clayton
Act authorizes a state to pursue an injunction—but not damages—for injury to general
economy); see also California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 275–76, 295–96 (1990)
(concluding that divestiture is a form of injunctive relief authorized by section 16 to remedy an
illegal merger).
30. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 824–25.
31. See Directory of Antitrust Officials, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 8905 (May 7, 2003)
(listing members of the Antitrust Committee and officers of the Multistate Antitrust Task
Force).
32. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 824–25.
33. For an overview of state antitrust law and enforcement, see sources cited supra note 10.
34. Other distinguishing characteristics have been identified from time to time, but those
three are the most compelling. Other touted advantages are the flip side of lamented
CALKINS.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
680 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:673
1. Familiarity with Local Markets. For all the talk about
globalization of competition, antitrust enforcement is routinely
concerned about competition in local markets. Almost half of the
FTC’s merger complaints make allegations involving local markets,35
which should not be surprising given the number of challenges to
mergers in groceries, gasoline retailing, construction, natural gas
transportation, and health care.36 Intimate knowledge about local
competitive conditions is essential to effective antitrust enforcement.
State attorneys general have a clear comparative advantage in
understanding local markets.37 It would make little sense for
Washington-based enforcers trying to craft divestitures to remedy a
grocery store merger, or debating about the viability of stores on
different sides of some small town, not to consult with or involve a
state enforcer who is more likely to be familiar with the history and
current market dynamics of that area.38 Similarly, the Antitrust
deficiencies. State partisans can boast of responsiveness to citizen views. See Lloyd Constantine,
Antitrust Federalism, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 163, 182–83 (1990) (noting that state enforcement
maximizes citizen participation). Judge Posner laments over-responsiveness to special interests.
See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, at 281 (“[States] are excessively influenced by
interest groups . . . .”). One side claims that state enforcement “promotes diversity and
innovation in competition policy and enforcement.” Constantine, supra, at 183–84; see also
Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Merger Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1004, 1036–39 (2001) (noting the role of states as an additional force in antitrust
enforcement). Others complain of that same diversity and innovation. See Jonathan Rose, State
Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 71, 115–26 (1994) (lamenting
differences in federal and state antitrust standards); David A. Zimmerman, Comment, Why
State Attorneys General Should Have a Limited Role in Enforcing the Federal Antitrust Law of
Mergers, 48 EMORY L.J. 337, 346–66 (1999) (same). One side views state enforcers as essential
fillers of enforcement “gaps”; others dispute the existence of any gap. See Deborah Platt
Majoras, Antitrust and Federalism, Remarks Before the New York State Bar Association 16–17
(Jan. 23, 2003) (denying the existence of a federal enforcement void), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200683.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
35. Computed from FTC Bureau of Competition, Antitrust Enforcement Activities Fiscal
Year 1999—Mar. 15, 2003 (2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
36. See id. at 1–18 (listing FTC merger complaints and describing the outcomes).
37. See Robert B. Bell, Counterpoint: States Should Stay out of National Mergers,
ANTITRUST, Spring 1989, at 37, 37 (“There is little doubt that states should take the lead in
scrutinizing and challenging mergers that are purely local in scope.”); First, supra note 34, at
1034–36 (“[T]his understanding [of local markets] gives state antitrust enforcers a comparative
advantage over federal antitrust enforcers.”).
38. The importance of state involvement in challenging localized mergers has prompted
calls for allocating areas of primary responsibility. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, When Should
States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047,
1072–89 (1990) (proposing a series of “‘federalism guidelines,’ which would allocate
responsibility for enforcement between the DOJ and the FTC and the states, with certain
categories of responsibility”).
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Division has recognized that it can be logical for states to take the
lead in challenging conspiracies in localized markets.39
2. Familiarity with Local Institutions. State attorneys general
are more likely than federal enforcers to know and be known and be
trusted by state and local government officials. They are thus
uniquely situated to help prevent anticompetitive harm from being
inflicted on or by government agencies.40
Government and nonprofit entities play major roles, even in the
United States’ capitalist economy. A third of the gross domestic
product (GDP) is government:41 Governments purchase huge
quantities of good and services, including health care, education, and
prison services. Government regulations affect where and how people
live, how people are born, and how they die.42 State and local
governments are critical points of focus for competition policy. Both
government purchasers and government regulators are notoriously
susceptible to anticompetitive manipulation.43 Although federal
39. See Protocol for Increased State Prosecution of Criminal Antitrust Offenses, 70
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 362, 362 (1996) (announcing that the Division may transfer
to state attorneys general the criminal prosecutorial responsibility “for offenses including, but
not limited to, bid rigging and/or price fixing in localized markets”).
40. See Patricia A. Conners, State Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Recent
Developments, Written Materials to Accompany Remarks by the Chair of the Multistate
Antitrust Task Force before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law and the American Health
Lawyers Association Program on Health Law 2 (May 15–16, 2003) (transcript on file with Duke
Law Journal) (finding many attorneys general counsel state regulatory boards and thus have a
“close relationship” with them).
41. Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future
Development of U.S. Competition Policy, Remarks at the Milton Handler Annual Antitrust
Review (Dec. 10, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/handler.htm (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). For instance, government payments represent 45 percent of U.S. health
care spending. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Program Information on Medicare,
Medicaid, SCHIP, and Other Programs 6 (June 2002), at www.cms.gov/charts/series/sec1.ppt (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
42. The growth of regulation is chronicled in countless works, including DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 320–47 (1989).
43. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 144 (1985)
(government purchasers “are most susceptible to collusive pricing” because they reveal bidding
information and thus discourage conspirators from “cheating” on a cartel); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347 (1978) (“Predation by abuse of governmental procedures,
including administrative and judicial processes, presents an increasingly dangerous threat to
competition.”); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 728 (1986) (“[M]arket regulation has become the target of increasing criticism for
being an instrument by which industry can exploit the public . . . .”).
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enforcers regularly engage in “competition advocacy,” as it is called,44
no Washington-based voice is likely to be listened to as carefully as
the voice of the state attorney general.45
3. Compensating Individuals. State attorneys general recover
money for injured individuals in two ways. First, states implicitly
represent taxpayers by recovering overcharges exacted from state
purchasing operations.46 Beyond that, state attorneys general are the
only governmental officials specifically authorized by federal statute
to recover monetary relief in treble damages for natural persons
injured by Sherman Act violations.47 The Justice Department has no
such power, and the FTC finds authority for a court to award
consumer redress only by implication (and very rarely invokes the
authority in antitrust cases).48 In 1976, the House Judiciary Committee
declared an intention to promote deterrence and compensation of
44. Timothy J. Muris, Creating a Culture of Competition: The Essential Role of
Competition Advocacy, Prepared Remarks Before the International Competition Network
Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities (Sept. 28, 2002), at http://www.ftc.
gov/speeches/muris/020928naples.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The FTC’s advocacy
filings are collected at http://www. ftc.gov/be/advofile.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
45. Cf. 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, Assistant Attorney General, State of Connecticut,
and Chair, NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 197, 214–15 (1991)
(discussing the role attorneys general regularly play both in representing regulatory boards and
counseling on antitrust).
46. See O’Connor, supra note 18, at 422 (“[V]irtually all states have the authority to
recover direct damages on behalf of state agencies.”).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000). Parens patriae authority was established by Title III of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000)).
48. Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000),
authorizes the FTC to seek injunctive relief, and that authorization has been interpreted by the
courts to permit the Commission also to obtain equitable remedies including disgorgement and
consumer redress. See, e.g., FTC v. Amy Travel Serv. Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 572 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he statutory grant of authority to the district court to issue permanent injunctions includes
the power to order any ancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the exercise of the
granted powers.”). Although the Commission routinely uses this authority in consumer
protection cases, it very rarely uses it in competition cases. See FTC Policy Statement on
Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases (July 25, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he
commission has . . . used its monetary remedial authority [of disgorgement and restitution in the
competition area] sparingly.”). In theory, the Justice Department could ask the courts to read
the attorney general’s authorization to seek injunctions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (2000), as
empowering courts to use equitable powers to award money, but it has never done so. The
Sherman Act expressly authorizes forfeiture of property owned pursuant to an illegal
conspiracy, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (2000), but the DOJ rarely invokes this power, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 756 n.208.
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consumers “by providing the consumer an advocate in the
enforcement process—his State attorney general.”49
The problem of governmental remedies for antitrust violations is
longstanding. Unlike the states, federal enforcers almost always
choose between two remedies: criminal penalties (an option only for
the Justice Department) and a prospective-only injunction of limited
duration.50 Although criminal penalties are increasingly serious,51 they
are appropriate only in a limited range of cases.52 Federal civil
remedies are intended to be preventative, not punitive.53 If the only
risk associated with disobeying antitrust laws is a requirement to obey
those laws prospectively, deterrence is singularly missing; on the
other hand, a heavy-handed, regulatory decree may harm consumers
by chilling future competition and driving up future expenses. The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act anticipated that federal and state enforcers
would work together so that, through the states’ use of their parens
patriae authority, ill-gotten gains would be turned over to consumers
and antitrust violations would be adequately deterred through
monetary transfers rather than onerous decrees.54
49. H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, pt. 1, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2574.
50. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A
NUTSHELL 450–52 (4th ed. 1994).
51. Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and
Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 699–702 (2001); see R. Hewitt Pate, The DOJ
International Antitrust Program—Maintaining Momentum, Remarks before the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law 2003 Forum on International Competition Law 2–3 (Feb. 6, 2003) (noting that
in the past seven years, the Antitrust Division has obtained thirty-eight fines of $10 million or
more and six fines of $100 million or more; in the past four years, thirty defendants have been
sentenced to imprisonment of a year or more), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/20073.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
52. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL § III-16 (3d rev. ed.
2002) (“In general, current Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and
prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements such as price fixing, bid
rigging and horizontal customer and territorial allocations.”), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch3.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
53. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) (“Orders of the Federal Trade
Commission are not intended to impose criminal punishment or exact compensatory damages
for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future.”); cf. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537
(7th Cir. 1997) (approving disgorgement because it was remedial and not punitive);
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at IV-51 (“In general, adequate relief in a civil
antitrust case is relief that will (1) stop the illegal practices alleged in the complaint, (2) prevent
their renewal, and (3) restore competition to the state that would have existed had the violation
not occurred.”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch4.pdf (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, pt. 1, at 4, 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2573–
74, 2586–87; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 15f (2000) (requiring the U.S. Attorney General to notify states of
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The states not only have the assignment and authority to transfer
ill-gotten gains to consumers; they also have the experience. As is set
out below in Section C.3, state attorneys general have used their
parens patriae authority and state statutes to provide substantial
monetary relief for consumers. States now have both the tools for
delivering compensation to consumers, as well as the experience in
using these tools.
C. The Critics
One of the dramatic moments in the Microsoft story came when
Judge Jackson, with the concurrence of the parties, referred the
dispute to mediation by Judge Posner.55 Four months of intense effort
yielded no fruit,56 except possibly in one respect: it may have caused
Judge Posner to reflect seriously on multilevel antitrust enforcement.
The Microsoft litigation began in May 1998 when the Justice
Department and a score of states filed separate complaints alleging
that Microsoft had illegally monopolized the Internet browser
market, and the case has dominated antitrust headlines ever since.57
The cases were consolidated and tried jointly, resulting—after the
failed attempt at mediation by Judge Posner—in a sweeping win for
the Justice Department and the states. The district court found that
Microsoft had illegally monopolized the operating system market,
attempted to monopolize browsers, and bundled Windows and
Internet Explorer. To address these violations, the court ordered,
among other things, the splitting up of the company.58 The court of
appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
reassignment to a different trial judge.59 After a presidential election
changed the leadership team heading the Justice Department,60 the
parens opportunities and share investigative files).
55. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(noting mediation was tried with consent of the parties).
56. See id. at 48 (“Mediation failed after nearly four months of settlement talks between
the parties.”).
57. See Himes, supra note 18 (recounting federal-state efforts in the case); see generally
KEN AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFT AND ITS ENEMIES (2001) (describing details of
the Microsoft case).
58. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35–56 (D.D.C. 2000); United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).
59. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
60. See Top Antitrust Enforcement Personnel (1890–present), 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
8554 (June 25, 2003) (listing that Charles A. James, President George W. Bush’s first Antitrust
Attorney General, began service on June 21, 2001).
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Department and nine states agreed to a consent order, which a new
district judge modified and entered over the objections of nine states
and the District of Columbia.61
After his mediation effort had failed, Judge Posner promptly
called for stripping the states of their authority to bring state or
federal antitrust suits except in their capacities as injured consumers.62
“States do not have the resources to do more than free ride on federal
antitrust litigation, complicating its resolution; in addition, they are
too subject to influence by interest groups that may represent a
potential antitrust defendant’s competitors.”63 Posner sees states as
contributing little to the effective enforcement of antitrust law, while
imposing costs either by misusing the law to advance special interests
or through making settlement more difficult.64 Almost by itself,
Microsoft had made state antitrust enforcement newly controversial.65
The most recent catalogue of criticisms of state antitrust
enforcement is contained in the remarks Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Deborah Platt Majoras prepared for a program on antitrust
and federalism.66 In each case attributing the views to others, she
identified four problems that have been made: (1) “many believe that
the states’ role adds a significant layer of uncertainty for businesses in
their consideration of possible mergers and in their business
conduct—uncertainty that may chill procompetitive mergers and
conduct and add significant costs”; (2) “some believe that the
61. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 n.3 (D.D.C. 2002). One state is
pursuing an appeal from that decision. See Joint Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance with
the Final Judgments at 1 n.1, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that West Virginia has dismissed its appeal; Massachusetts is still
pursuing its appeal of the States’ Final Judgment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f201100/201135.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
62. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, at 281; Posner, New Economy, supra note 1,
at 940. Professor Harry First provides the best state-oriented rebuttal, arguing that Posner’s
findings of free-riding on federal antitrust litigation, undue interest group influence, and
incapable state attorneys are unfounded. First, supra, note 34, at 1027–34.
63. Posner, New Economy, supra note 1, at 940.
64. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, at 281–82; cf. Zimmerman, supra note 34
(calling for legislation to compel states to follow federal merger policy).
65. See, e.g., William Rainbolt, Panelists Debate Role of State Government in Antitrust
Enforcement, ST. B. NEWS, Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 10 (reporting panelist debate about
appropriateness of state antitrust enforcement). “Newly” controversial, because state antitrust
enforcement has always attracted criticism. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, State Antitrust
Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 71, 127 (1994) (“State merger
enforcement causes numerous problems and costs and may be unwise from a policy
standpoint.”).
66. Majoras, supra note 34, at 2–7.
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states . . . are more likely to take into account factors that have been
discarded in U.S. antitrust jurisprudence”; (3) “some believe that
state antitrust officials are more likely to be influenced by individual
lobbying businesses within their states”; and (4) “some believe that as
many antitrust matters have grown not only increasingly national, but
increasingly global, in scope, states should confine their role to local
or perhaps regional antitrust issues.”67 Although she conceded that
the non-settling states in Microsoft “further[ed] the development of
antitrust jurisprudence,”68 Deputy Majoras evinced uneasiness over
the role of the states in that case and others.
D. The States’ Activities
Microsoft is the exception.69 It may be the only state case
principally devoted to seeking injunctive relief for alleged
monopolization.70 That is just not what states typically do. As
discussed below, the vast majority of state antitrust complaints and
other activities fit comfortably within the bounds of the states’
consensus comparative advantages.
State attorneys general deserve some of the blame for the
misperception. The Antitrust Division and the FTC chronicle all of
their activities on their websites,71 which are constantly being updated
and improved. Both agencies publish reports with a wealth of data
67. Id. at 3–6.
68. Id. at 16.
69. See First, supra note 34, at 1018–19 (noting that Microsoft “is not particularly
representative of state antitrust enforcement”). For a spirited defense of the states’ role in
Microsoft, see Himes, supra note 18.
70. See Patricia A. Conners, Chair, Multi-State Antitrust Task Force, State Enforcement—
Trends and Issues, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, State Antitrust
Enforcement Committee Spring Meeting 3–11 (Apr. 2, 2003), available at
www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/statetrends.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (canvassing a wide range of past and current cases, of which only a single state merger
challenge sought principally injunctive relief); Jay L. Himes & Patricia A. Conners, Presentation
for the Antitrust Federalism and Multistate Antitrust Enforcement, 14–15 (June 7, 2002) (listing
recent illustrative cases of multistate enforcement activities). Similarly, if one goes to the
consent orders collected on the best state-enforcement-oriented website, www.abanet.org/
antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/settlements.html (last visited November 4, 2003), one finds
many of the cases referenced above, a few state court settlements, other locally oriented
settlements, some resale price maintenance settlements, and only one injunction-oriented
proceeding on a local hospital joint venture. The cases are overwhelmingly about getting money
for consumers.
71. See Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2003); Federal Trade Commission, at http://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
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and statistics.72 NAAG is strikingly different. Its website73 includes no
data, no annual reports, no listings of different kinds of cases—
nothing that would communicate an understanding of what NAAG
does. Following hyperlinks leads one to an ABA Antitrust Section
page that lists NAAG amicus briefs,74 and another one that lists
NAAG settlements, organized by judicial circuit,75 but the website
poorly communicates what state attorneys general do in antitrust
enforcement. NAAG publishes a monthly Antitrust Bulletin (formerly
titled a Report, but for simplicity references herein will be only to
“Bulletins”) comprised of reports on state activities and other
antitrust news, but the Bulletin is not widely available and includes no
summary data. NAAG representatives regularly give speeches about
recent initiatives,76 but inevitably the emphasis is on the major
projects and the big-picture policy work,77 which can communicate a
distorted picture.
The extent to which state attorneys general concentrate on areas
of their comparative advantage becomes clear from a review of a
72. See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT: FY 1999,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/4523.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Attendees at the ABA Antitrust Section 2003 Spring Meeting could walk away with a glossy,
twenty-three-page booklet chronicling the FTC’s year and separate compendia of
accomplishments by each of the three bureaus (including a sixty-page compendium of Bureau of
Competition accomplishments). See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR
CONSUMERS: THE FTC YEAR IN REVIEW (Apr. 2003) (featuring cover photos of, among other
things, a mother receiving a telemarketer’s call during the family dinner), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/aba/gpra2003.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
73. http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-antitrust.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2003) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
74. See Competition Advocacy by the States Attorneys General, at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/advocacy.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
75. See Settlement Agreements with State Attorneys General, at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/settlements.html (last visited Sept.
10, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
76. See, e.g., Conners, supra note 70; Patricia A. Conners & Kevin J. O’Connor, Antitrust
Enforcement Regarding Vertical Restraints by State Attorneys General, Remarks at ALI-ABA
Course of Study Product Distribution and Marketing (March 20–22, 2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/atenforcementvertical.pdf (on file
with the Duke Law Journal); Himes & Conners, supra note 70.
77. See, e.g., Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 367,
373–74 (2001) (including remarks by the chair of the NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force
reporting to the organized bar on recent big-picture developments); see also Thomas Greene &
Robert L. Hubbard, State Antitrust Enforcement, in 44th Annual Antitrust Law Institute, 1371
PLI/CORP. 765, 780 (2003) (enforcement actions by individual states are “[l]argely under-
reported” although they “represent[ ] the area of greatest state enforcement”).
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decade of Bulletins. Since they report developments considered
newsworthy, the results are biased in favor of the major national
matters—which makes the results all the more striking.
The methodology was as follows. Every Bulletin from 1993 to
2002, was read.78 For each state lawsuit reported,79 I noted (a) whether
it had a significant local or regional aspect (typically because a local
market was alleged); (b) whether the state attorney general was
representing or appearing before a public entity; and (c) whether it
represented an effort to compensate individual victims directly or
through cy pres. Results were as follows80:
Total lawsuits: 213
Lawsuits with local aspect: 174 (82%)
Public entity lawsuits: 59   (28%)
Lawsuits to compensate
consumers:
29   (14%)
1. Local Emphasis. State antitrust enforcement as reflected in
this survey is overwhelmingly local. Challenged mergers involve
hospitals, movie theaters, waste disposal operations, grocery stores,
Jewish funeral homes, dairies, radio stations, gasoline stations, ski
resorts, de-icing salt production facilities, and a sardine processing
plant. Some of the mergers feature major national firms where a state
is joining with a federal agency (grocery store mergers are a prime
example), but it seems logical to draw on state-level expertise when
examining street-level competition between stores. Challenged
conspiracies involved travel agents and tour bus operators, health
care providers, school bus companies, road builders, roofers, auto
78. Many thanks to Saira Nayak-Lieb, NAAG Antitrust & Health Care Counsel, for
providing these to me. The last four months of 2001 are not covered by Bulletins, so the 2001
Bulletins were supplemented by a review of the BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report.
79. Bulletins might have multiple reports of a single lawsuit—one for its filing, one for a
key court decision, one for settlement, etc.—but I counted each lawsuit only the first time it
appeared. Multiple defendants settling separate times were counted only as one entry. Lawsuits
by different states, filed at different times, were counted as separate entries even if each lawsuit
challenged the same kind of conspiracy by the same defendant.
No count was made of letters and amicus briefs, of which there is a fair amount. See
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/advocacy.html#acb (last visited Aug.
2, 2003) (listing letters and amicus briefs relating to antitrust cases filed by state attorneys
general).
80 Percentages sum to more than 100 because some local lawsuits involved public entities or
compensation of consumers).
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body shops, dairies, group homes repairers, bakers of Italian bread,
individuals who gave carriage rides, towers, and trash haulers. Tying
violations, where the purchase of one product is illegally conditioned
on the purchase of another, include mobile homes and tours of
Alcatraz.
States play an important role by helping inform federal enforcers
of local market realities and by helping persuade courts that federal
enforcers have considered those realities.81 Missouri was a crucial
partner of the FTC in challenging with temporary success a local
hospital merger,82 and states have played important roles on their own
or with federal enforcers in questioning other hospital mergers.83 On
the other hand, federal enforcers failed to achieve even temporary
success when New York supported a local hospital merger84 and when
Michigan remained primly on the sidelines of a challenge to a
Michigan hospital merger.85 Hospital mergers raise political issues
that make them unusually difficult to challenge, but the federal
81. For a good example of how federal and state enforcers can work together in the context
of a grocery merger case, see First, supra note 34, at 1024–25. In contrast, a trial court denied an
FTC-sought temporary restraining order stating: “It looks to me like Washington D.C. once
again thinks they know better what’s going on in southwest Missouri. I think they ought to stay
in D.C.” FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1995) (staying the denial of the
temporary restraining order and affirming the denial of preliminary injunction).
82. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(granting preliminary injunction to Missouri and the FTC even though federal and state
attorneys were “‘out-lawyered’ by the defendants”), rev’d, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Plant Health Sys., Inc., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
70,759, at 73,200 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (granting a consent judgment in the first case filed jointly by
the Division and a state); Rhode Island Hospitals Call Off Merger After Attorney General Seeks
Concessions, NAAG ANTITRUST REP., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 10 (describing a hospital merger
called off after Rhode Island attorney general sought concessions); see also Anne K. Bingaman,
Antitrust Division Cooperation with State Attorneys General, Address Before the National
Association of Attorneys General (Oct. 11, 1995), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/951011.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (saluting success of DOJ
cooperation with states in antitrust enforcement); cf. New York v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp.
2d 399, 411–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting state’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
purported joint operating agreement is illegal per se). Of course, states proceeding alone also
face challenges, as California experienced when it bravely (but unsuccessfully) took on a local
hospital merger it viewed as anticompetitive. See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d
1057, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d mem., 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000).
84. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 134–35 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (refusing to enjoin merger strongly supported by New York State Department of Health).
85. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121
F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (including multiple amici briefs, some by attorneys general from other
states, but not by Michigan).
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agencies face an uphill battle when the antitrust enforcer who knows
the area best is opposed to an antitrust challenge.86
2. Public Institutions. Not surprisingly, given the predominance
of local issues, many of the matters involved state or local institutions;
indeed, frequently an attorney general was representing an aggrieved
public entity. According to attorneys general, schools were
overcharged for milk, roofs, carpets, and fuel; local governments were
overcharged for fuel, waste disposal, flooring, and ambulance
services; and state agencies were overcharged for road building,
infant formula, travel, and health care services.
States can be unusually effective at detecting and preventing
these bid-rigging activities (agreements that prevent competition for
government contracts theoretically allocated by competitive bid).
Government procurement rules almost invite price fixing, because
they make instantaneous the detection of “cheating” conspirators.87
States have worked effectively with purchasing authorities to deter
and prosecute such illegality, returning money to the taxpayers and
the victims of conspiracy.88 States and the federal government proceed
criminally, as well,89 but government bid-rigging cases are particularly
attractive examples of the importance of compensating victims.90
Additionally, the states’ special local ties are important in ways
that go beyond representing government agencies victimized by
conspiracy. Contact Lenses91 is an unusually good example. After a
two-year investigation, Florida filed this lawsuit challenging an
alleged industry boycott of alternative channels of distribution of
contact lenses,92 and thereafter a total of thirty-five states and various
86. See Robert F. Leibenluft, Issues in Litigating Hospital Mergers, Presentation to
FTC/DOJ Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy 12, 22 (Mar. 29, 2003)
(describing the problem of “[h]ome court disadvantage” and noting that state support is
critical), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/docs/leibenluft2.pdf (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
87. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 43, at 144.
88. See, e.g., Press Release, Florida Attorney General, Milk Case Recoveries Set National
Record (Sept. 29, 1988) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the more than $32
million recovered by Florida against milk companies accused of price fixing in schools).
89. State antitrust indictments are collected at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/
state-antitrust/litdocs.html#indictments (last visited Aug. 2, 2003).
90. What can be more appealing than returning ill-gotten gains to schools? See, e.g., Press
Release, Florida Attorney General, supra note 88.
91. In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,150, at
89,542 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (denying defense motions for summary judgment).
92. NAAG ANTITRUST REP., May–June 1994, at 3.
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private parties worked for eight years successfully to resolve the
matter.93 State agencies easily could have blocked alternative
distribution channels, and, indeed, the defendants argued
unsuccessfully that various state statutory and regulatory
impediments had done so, thus depriving the defendants’ acts of
consequence.94 A key court decision denied summary judgment
because it found a host of unresolved issues related to this defense,
including “whether the states are actively enforcing their [regulatory]
statutes.”95 State attorneys general were unusually valuable defenders
of the competitive process because they were uniquely well
positioned to help persuade state agencies neither to block such
distribution nor to support defense arguments that agency regulations
had done so.
3. Compensation to Consumers. One of the states’ most
powerful competitive advantages—and one that they have been
employing vigorously—is their ability to deliver substantial monetary
recoveries directly to consumers.96 For example, in Compact Discs,97
about 3.5 million people will receive almost $13 apiece as their share
of a settlement.98 This scale of distribution of a modest sum was
possible only because the states implemented an innovative web-
93. In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1030 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2001)
(Final Order and Judgment), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/lensfinalorder.pdf; see also Bausch & Lomb Will Pay Rebates Valued at $17.5 Million to
Settle States’ Charges, 80 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 164, 164 (2001) (reporting terms
of settlement). The FTC has recently become active in protesting impediments to alternative
contact lens distribution. See Comments of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission,
Intervenor, Declaratory Ruling Proceeding on the Interpretation and Applicability of Various
Statutes and Regulations Concerning the Sale of Contact Lenses (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health
Mar. 27, 2002) (stating that stand-alone sellers of replacement contact lenses should not be
required to obtain Connecticut licenses), at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v020007.htm (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
94. See In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 89,542
(denying defense motions for summary judgment).
95. Id.
96. See First, supra note 34, at 1018 (noting that eleven of thirteen cases surveyed included
a monetary award).
97. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. 2:01-CV-125-P-H,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12663 (D. Me. July 9, 2003).
98. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 2003-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 74,060, at 96,591 (D. Me. 2003) (certifying class and preliminarily approving
settlement).
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based claim submission.99 In Bristol Myers-Squibb,100 the FTC settled a
case against a pharmaceutical firm that allegedly abused the patent
system to block entry of generic competition.101 The states deferred to
the FTC’s lead in crafting injunctive relief,102 but are expected to
recover over $150 million.103 In another generic drug case, Cardizem,104
the defendant pharmaceutical companies agreed to pay $80 million to
compensate consumers, state agencies, and insurance companies for
overcharging them (in addition to $110 million won by private drug
wholesalers).105 In Contact Lenses, more than 18,000 checks have been
processed, from a total cash-and-coupon settlement of $90 million.106
In Vitamins,107 state attorneys general won two settlements—$30
99. Id. at 96,594 (“Here, given the millions of unidentified CD purchasers during the class
period, individual notice was not possible. . . . [O]ver 5 million visitors logged on to the
settlement website, www.misiccdsettlement.com . . . .”); Court Approves CD Settlements, Except
for Sales by Music Clubs, 84 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 619, 619–21 (June 20, 2003)
(reviewing settlement and litigation, including the web-based submission method for claims).
100. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., FTC File Nos. 0010221 (Taxol), 0110046 (BuSpar), 0210181
(Cisplatin) (Mar. 7, 2003) (“Agreement Containing Consent Order”), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersconsent.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see
Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of Abusing Government
Processes to Stifle Generic Drug Competition (Mar. 7, 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2003/03/bms.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
101. Press Release, FTC, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. Bristol-Myers Squibb Settles Charges for Stifling Generic Drug Competition, 84
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 238, 238–39 (Mar. 14, 2003); Press Release, Florida
Attorney General, States Reach Tentative Agreement with Bristol Myers-Squibb in Antitrust
Drug Cases (Jan. 7, 2003), at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/
9E2439956993A54285256CA70075AB79?OpenDocument (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
104. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., No. 99-Md-1278 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2003)
(consent agreement), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/aventiscarderm.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
105. See Press Release, Florida Attorney General, Drug Makers to Pay $80 Million in
Settlement (Jan. 27, 2003), at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/b57e80b88fcebfad
85256403005cbc7a/803a0e20da608bba85256cbc00498749!OpenDocument (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
106. Declaration of Joy Ann Bull Re Final Accounting of Settlement Funds, In re
Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 97-861-CIV-J-20 (M.D. Fla.), Ex. 5 (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (reporting that 18,786 checks were mailed); E-mail from Robert Hubbard,
Office of the New York State Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Stephen Calkins,
Professor of Law, Wayne State University (Aug. 25, 2003, 16:19:00 EST) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (noting that the final order included a $90 million settlement); see States Reach
$60 Million Settlement with Johnson & Johnson in Disposable Contact Lens Case, NAAG
ANTITRUST REP., May–June 2001, at 5 (detailing the settlement with one defendant); Conners,
supra note 70, at 4 (reporting on the settlement).
107. Giral v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. 98 CA 7467 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2001)
(master settlement agreement), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state
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million for their own purchases and (with private plaintiffs) $225
million for indirect business and individual purchasers—and
California won an additional $85 million.108 In Mylan,109 the FTC and
the states worked together to resolve the case. The FTC received an
unusual disgorgement remedy, but the vast bulk of the $147 million
recovery was distributed by the states.110
The FTC has recognized that it lacks the experience and
resources to distribute efficiently competition-based disgorgement
funds. It has used this authority “cautiously” and “sparingly,”
employing it in only a handful of cases.111 In the Commission’s two
recent exercises of this authority, it has combined the funds it
recovered with other funds in a single claims administration process
(such that, in Mylan, the states distributed even the FTC’s portion of
the recovery). Beyond that, the states’ ability to represent the public,
including under state law, simplifies litigation (and settlement
discussions) by removing a series of standing/Illinois Brick issues
from the table.112
antitrust/vitamins1.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see States Reach Settlement with
Vitamin Makers in Massive Price-Fixing Case, NAAG ANTITRUST REP., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 1.
108. Giral; see First, supra note 34, at 1021–23, 1022 n.101 (describing the case generally,
emphasizing New York’s role, and pointing out difficulties in the case and the final disposition);
O’Connor, supra note 26, at 36–37, 37 n.24 (same); Press Release, California Attorney General,
Attorney General Lockyer Announces $80 Million Antitrust Settlement Involving Alleged
International Vitamins Price-Fixing Scheme (Oct. 10, 2000), at http://www.caag.state.ca.us/
newsalerts/2000/00-129.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (detailing breakdown of the
settlement: $42 million in refunds to businesses, $38 million for consumer health programs, plus
$5 million costs).
109. Connecticut v. Mylan Labs., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,273, at 90,403–04 (D.D.C.
2001); see O’Connor, supra note 26, at 36–37 (describing case as an example of how the law is
moving towards allowing indirect purchasers to recover under antitrust law); Richard Wolfram
& Spencer Weber Waller, Contemporary Antitrust Federalism: Cluster Bombs or Rough
Justice?, in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE, supra note 10, at 1 (same).
110. Cf. FTC, Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm (July 25, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“[A] single claims administration process handled the administration of all the
funds.”).
111. Id.
112. As noted above, federal law prevents most recoveries by indirect purchasers, whereas
state law, especially when enforced by an attorney general, does not. See supra notes 23–29 and
accompanying text. The law of standing is a major issue in private litigation, see ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 838–66, whereas, by definition, state and federal parens
patriae suits allow recoveries on behalf of injured consumers.
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E. State Antitrust Enforcement in Perspective
The above review makes clear that state antitrust enforcement is
based overwhelmingly on the states’ comparative advantages. The
vast majority of cases involve local or regional markets and
competitive effects. State enforcers almost never bring national
monopolization cases.
This conclusion is consistent with the expressed views of state
enforcers. According to the chair of the Multistate Antitrust Task
Force, a state antitrust enforcement issue can be identified by asking,
among other things, whether the matter has “a local or regional
impact upon the state’s consumers or economy,” whether “state or
local governmental agencies [are] impacted,” and whether consumers
can “directly or indirectly benefit from state enforcement.”113
Of course, not every state antitrust case is consistent with states’
comparative advantages. For instance, in 2001, Utah sought to enjoin
GS Industries’ acquisition of Nucor Corporation’s Utah-based
manufacturing assets because GS Industries planned to move the
business to Chile.114 Utah’s action might have had more to do with an
interest in employment than in competition. Similarly, in 1999,
Indiana sought to enjoin the merger of B.F. Goodrich and Coltec
Industries115 out of concern about the global market for integrated
aircraft landing systems and 1100 South Bend jobs.116 Likewise, in
1993, Pennsylvania sought to enjoin the merger of Russell Stover
Candies and Whitman Chocolates, with the attorney general saying
that, although the case would be argued solely on antitrust grounds,
he “could not, ‘as a responsible official, ignore the fact that this
merger will put 600 people in the Philadelphia area out of work.’”117
113. Patricia A. Conners, The Role of State Antitrust Enforcement in Our System of
Concurrent Enforcement, Remarks Delivered at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2002 Fall
Forum 20–22 (Nov. 7–8, 2002) (transcript on file with the Duke Law Journal).
114. See Utah Seeks to Block Acquisition in Grinding Ball Market, NAAG ANTITRUST REP.,
Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 6 (describing lawsuit and negotiated standstill agreement); see also Frank
Haflich, GSI to Resume Grinding Media Output, AM. METAL MARKET, Sept. 5, 2002, at 1
(describing proposed transaction).
115. Indiana Attorney General Seeks to Block Merger of B.F. Goodrich and Coltec, NAAG
ANTITRUST REP., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 11.
116. See CIGNA to Drop Medicare HMO in Ohio, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 30,
1999, at 2C (describing Indiana’s reasons for attempting to enjoin the merger).
117. Pennsylvania Sues to Block Chocolate Merger, NAAG ANTITRUST REP., May–June
1993, at 5; see Pennsylvania v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1993 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,224, at
70,095 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing injunction for want of competitive effect). The dispute was
settled by the parties’ agreeing to two years of conduct restraints, paying $35,000 for job
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Even when a state is operating in an area of its comparative
advantage, it may take action in tension with what many might
consider sound competition policy. For instance, last year, the Puerto
Rico district court was so outraged at what it saw as the Puerto Rico
Secretary of Justice’s attempt to use antitrust laws to promote
unrelated social policies that it enjoined her from attempting to block
a grocery store merger.118 Even state efforts to pursue antitrust
policies may engender controversy. For instance, states have made
something of a specialty of pursuing vertical restraints cases,119 an area
of considerable antitrust disagreement.120 Most fundamentally, the
states’ increasing success in winning large monetary recoveries has
triggered a debate about appropriate levels of deterrence.121
Discomfort is particularly acute with respect to indirect purchasers: If
treble damages based on an entire overcharge can be recovered by a
assistance and economic development, and stating an intention to patronize a Pennsylvania
supplier. Pennsylvania Resolves Competitive Concerns with Boxed Chocolates Industry
Acquisition, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 361, 361–62 (1993).
118. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 238 F. Supp. 2d 395, 409 (D.P.R. 2002) (“[E]vents
culminated in the vindictive filing of a state antitrust lawsuit in an effort to coerce
Plaintiffs . . . .”), vacated at request of parties, 322 F.3d 747 (1st Cir. 2003). The dispute was
settled while on appeal, with Wal-Mart agreeing to divest two additional stores and to maintain
for a decade its level of local employment and purchases. Ivan Roman, Wal-Mart’s Deal with
Government Fails to End Monopoly Fears, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2003, at A22. Twenty
states filed an amicus brief supporting Puerto Rico’s right to pursue its own antitrust claim “in
the interests of consumers,” while taking “no position on whether the specific items Puerto Rico
sought in its negotiations were likely to improve the competitive situation in the relevant local
markets.” Brief of Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. at 10–11, 11 n.12, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 322 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 2003) (No. 02-2710).
119. See Conners & O’Connor, supra note 76, at 2 (“Vertical enforcement continues to be a
priority for the States.”).
120. See generally Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism:
Parker and Arc America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29, 41–42 (2000) (seeing virtue in diversity
of views about vertical restraints). Compare Richard Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 25 (1980) (“[A]ll
purely vertical restrictions in distribution should be legal per se . . . .”), with Peter C. Carstensen,
The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: The Efficiency Hypothesis versus the Rent-
Seeking, Strategic Alternatives, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571 (2001) (arguing that vertical
restraints are not as procompetitive as many believe).
121. See Michael L. Denger & D. Jarrett Arp, Does Our Multifaceted Enforcement System
Promote Sound Competition Policy?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 41, 43 (describing risk of
“unpredictable duplicative recoveries”); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment
in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 221–33 (2003) (noting that punishments range from too
little to too much).
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direct purchaser, is it fair or proper for indirect purchasers to recover
treble damages based on passed-on injuries?122
Nonetheless, states overwhelmingly pursue cases within their
comparative advantages and based on antitrust doctrines within the
mainstream. Monetary remedies, even if substantial, do not change
the structure of industry or mandate a change in business operations.
Microsoft really is the exception.
II.  FEDERAL ANTITRUST AGENCIES
While state antitrust enforcers enjoy only three primary
comparative advantages, federal enforcers enjoy boundless
advantages. The two federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the FTC
and the Antitrust Division, enjoy comparatively massive resources,
sweeping criminal enforcement powers, an elaborate merger
notification system, and traditional respect from Congress and the
courts.123 In short, the FTC and the Antitrust Division enjoy too many
advantages to make a comparison meaningful.
Rather than focus on advantages, as such, this Article suggests
some hallmarks of effective civil antitrust enforcement.124 In
particular, those hallmarks are the active participation by both
agencies; use of a variety of tools to address an issue; support for
mainstream, economics-oriented antitrust while addressing important
questions; litigation; and enforcement by both public and private
entities. Having set out those hallmarks, the Article then illustrates
their importance by examining federal antitrust agencies’ work on
addressing the intersection between the per se rule and the rule of
reason, and the possible existence and contours of a middle form of
scrutiny. The agencies’ efforts stand as a striking example of
respected work even though that work may not yet have resulted in
an ultimate resolution of the problem.125 Although the issues have not
122. See ABA Antitrust Report, supra note 2, at 21–24 (detailing the concern about
duplicative litigation, and noting that with indirect purchasers now being able to sue, the
number of duplicative cases will increase). The seemingly self-answering question is more
hypothetical than real, since so few cases come close to approximating that situation either
through litigation or through settlement; nonetheless, the tension is obvious and eventually will
have to be resolved.
123. Good overviews of the two agencies are provided in ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 603–724 (FTC), 725–802 (Antitrust Division).
124. Criminal antitrust enforcement is a crucial but separate world of its own.
125. Cf., e.g., ABA Antitrust Report, supra note 2 (recommending changes in agency
programs); Deborah A. Garza, A Comparative Analysis of the Clinton Antitrust Program and
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been finally resolved, the agencies have been working responsibly to
address them.
A. Hallmarks of Effective Civil Antitrust Enforcement
The United States has two federal antitrust agencies: the
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission.126 As a practical matter, the Antitrust Division and the
FTC enforce the same statutes, with a major and a minor exception:
Only the Division can bring criminal actions,127 and only the FTC can
allege “unfair methods of competition,” which is a slightly more
expansive wording than the usual antitrust statutes.128 The majority of
the agencies’ resources are devoted to criminal (DOJ) and merger
work.129 The bulk of the controversy about agency activities arises
from the rest of their activities.130 The agencies’ non-merger, civil
antitrust program is most likely to be healthy and accepted when it
bears several hallmarks.
1. Active Participation by Both Agencies. Although one can
debate the pros and cons of having two antitrust agencies, given that
the U.S. has two, the system works best when both are engaged on
legal issues. Specialization by line of commerce (business area) can
yield enforcement efficiencies; specialization by area of law generally
Suggestion of Changes to Come, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 64, 64 (identifying and analyzing
controversial aspects of Clinton administration antitrust); Press Release, Loyola University Law
School Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Bush Administration Gets a “C” for Antitrust
Enforcement (Oct. 9, 2002), at  http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/
bushgetc.shtml (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (giving low marks to other aspects of Bush’s
agencies).
126. GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 50, at 449–56 (describing the roles of the Antitrust
Division and FTC).
127. Id. at 450.
128. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 608–15 (noting that the
Commission has the authority to define “unfair competition” and bring actions for violations
thereof).
129. Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to
Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 61–62 (1989)
[hereinafter Kirkpatrick II]. The author was counsel to this committee.
130. See id. (noting that the FTC’s special role, which needs attention, is in its non-merger
work); Report of the ABA Antitrust Law Section Task Force on the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 765–69 (1989) [hereinafter Antitrust Section Task
Force Report] (describing the differing views of ABA section members on monopoly and
vertical restraints, two important areas of work outside of criminal and merger work).
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sacrifices too much.131 The agencies’ tendency to specialize by line of
commerce guarantees that each will have different experiences to
contribute to developing the law. Each agency has different strengths
from time to time. Law development is likely to work best when both
participate.132
2. Using a Wide Array of Tools. The agencies do far more than
litigate and settle cases. They promulgate guidelines and file amicus
briefs; they issue advisory opinions and business review letters and
staff advisory letters; their leaders give speeches and deliver prepared
testimony; they hold conferences and workshops and prepare
reports.133 It makes no sense for the litigating part of the operation to
be divorced from the rest. Especially for the FTC, which was designed
as an independent agency with broad powers, it is important to bring
as many powers as possible to bear on a problem.134
3. Addressing Important Questions from a Position of
Mainstream, Economics-Supported Antitrust. An agency’s efforts will
have greatest acceptance when the agency is seen as working within
mainstream antitrust to promote a legitimate, economics-based
enforcement agenda. Controversy is more likely to follow where an
agency head is questioning the agency’s importance,135 or an agency
can be portrayed as experimenting with extensions of the law136 or
with symbolically dramatic retrenchments.137
131. The clearance procedures between the two agencies are set out in DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 52, at VII-1 to VII-5, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch7.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A
2002 agency attempt to revise the clearance arrangements to make them more detailed and
precise was abandoned in the face of Congressional opposition. DOJ/FTC Clearance Agreement
Succumbs to Political Inflammation, 82 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 467, 467–69 (2002).
132. The advantages and importance of both agencies participating are discussed in
Kirkpatrick II, supra note 129, at 115–19, and Antitrust Section Task Force Report, supra note
130, at 771–72.
133. See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 50, at 449–56 (reviewing activities of federal
enforcers).
134. See also Kirkpatrick II, supra note 129, at 63.
135. See Daniel Oliver, Chairman, FTC, Luncheon Address at the 34th Annual Meeting of
the Antitrust Law Section, in 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 349, 350 (1986) (“[T]he principal source of
restraints on competition is government—the State. . . . The Federal Trade Commission is, of
course, part of the State, and historically has been part of the problem, along with the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice.”).
136. Cf. Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 925–27 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing
innovative FTC order requiring monopolist publisher of airline flight schedules to also publish
schedules for commuter airline connecting flights); United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., [U.S.
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4. Litigating. Government litigation is important: (a) for
evolution of legal doctrine, (b) for certainty and predictability, (c)
because some cases are wrongly decided, and (d) as a foundation for
and disciplining of agency actions.138 Cases being wrongly decided
matters because (i) the government must be able to afford to lose, (ii)
subsequent litigation should be sufficiently common that wrongly
decided cases can be buried in the sands of time, and (iii) wrong-
headed cases can attract criticism. All are illustrated by the agencies’
experience with the per se rule/rule of reason.
5. Interacting with Private Enforcement. Although government
agencies must enforce important antitrust laws even where, as with
merger law, there is little private enforcement of those laws,139 the
active involvement of the private sector yields a number of
advantages. Today, as always, antitrust litigation is overwhelmingly
private:140
Antitrust Case Summaries 1980–1988] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 53,436-37 (D. Conn. Dec.
19,1980) (accepting nolo contendere plea and ordering $250,000 fine in criminal resale price
maintenance case). This is not to suggest that an agency should never seek to move the law. See
Kirkpatrick II, supra note 129, at 62–63 (arguing that FTC development of uncertain legal
theories can be appropriate). Rather, it recognizes the much greater risks that flow from such an
attempt.
137. Cf. Baxter Will Not Urge Abandonment of Per Se Rule in Spray-Rite Argument, 45
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 888, 888 (Dec. 1, 1983) (describing legislation barring use
of funds to advocate abandonment of traditional rule); Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,105 (Jan. 23, 1985, withdrawn Aug. 10, 1993) (announcing and later
retracting change from traditional enforcement policy); Antitrust Section Task Force Report,
supra note 130, at 769 (concluding, about a Division effort sharply to change vertical restraint
law, that “this kind of confrontation, which in the end is unproductive in any event, should be
avoided”).
138. Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second Annual Bernstein
Lecture, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (describing factors (a)–(c)); see infra Part II.B.4(d)
(factor (d)).
139. See Phillip Areeda, Justice’s Merger Guidelines: The General Theory, 71 CAL. L. REV.
303, 305 (1983) (arguing that government case selection is much more critical to merger
enforcement than to areas with active private enforcement).
140. Antitrust Cases Filed in U.S. District Courts by Type of Case, 1975–2000, LexisNexis, at
http://www.lexis-nexis.com/statuniv (last visited Aug. 2, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2000, at 451 (2001)).  Antitrust class actions have made a notable comeback as well. Federal
Court Antitrust Class Action Statistics:
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US Cases F iled Private Cases Filed
The predominance of private litigation means that issues litigated
privately will receive much more ongoing and robust judicial
treatment, which is a benefit by itself, but further benefits flow when
private and government efforts address the same subject. Legal
standards must be set forth with clarity because one cannot rely on
administrative discretion to prevent abuses. Charges that antitrust is
nothing but an agency “pork barrel,” as have been leveled at
Japanese antitrust,141 have little traction for the bulk of the system.
The Office of the U.S. Courts, 2002 Annual Report, Table C-2A, U.S. District Courts—Civil
Cases Commenced by Nature of Suit, During the Twelve Month Periods Ending September 30,
1998 Through 2002, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/x05sep02.pdf (last visited
Aug. 2, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s
Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 416–17 (1997).
141. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Antitrust Pork Barrel in Japan, ANTITRUST, Summer 1992, at
40, 41. This comparison with Japanese antitrust is well developed in Harry First & Tadashi
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Changes in legal standards are made clearly and publicly, courts in
opinions subject to review and criticism. The agencies can and do play
a leading role though amicus briefs and guidelines, as has been seen,
but they are only part of the story.
The benefits flowing from the mix of private and public
enforcement are suggested also by the exception to this pattern,
merger enforcement. As has been chronicled elsewhere, the world of
merger enforcement has become almost exclusively an agency
practice, and largely regulatory.142 The occasional litigation provides a
check on overly aggressive agency policies, but nothing formally
serves as an effective prevention of agency permissiveness. During
the end of the Reagan years, for instance, Justice Department merger
enforcement appears to have declined,143 but there is little review of
nonenforcement.
For that matter, there is no meaningful way to know whether a
consent order is a draconian imposition of unreasonable requirements
or a blessing of a highly anticompetitive merger for the price of trivial
relief. Complaints and consent orders are typically filed
simultaneously,144 so it should be no surprise that the allegedly
threatened harms are addressed by the proposed relief. (One never
sees a complaint allege violations in ten local markets and an
admission that the remedy in five of those was all the government
could negotiate.) Because most of the external pressures favor
settlement—it reduces litigation risk, it saves resources, it avoids
criticism from the lawyers and economists representing the merging
Shiraishi, Concentrated Power: The Paradox of Antitrust in Japan (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
142. See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino
on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust
Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 869 (1997) (appraising the “transformation of merger
practice from litigation to very comprehensive regulation”); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust
Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997,
1053–54 (1986) (arguing that agencies as regulators are efficient but that the change from
traditional enforcement agencies to regulatory agencies lacks clear congressional approval).
143. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the
Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 225 (1988) (lamenting the “paucity of
enforcement actions”); Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United
States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 122 (2002) (noting that merger enforcement was at its lowest
during the “later Reagan years (1986–1989)”).
144. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer
or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 107–08, 114 n.98 (1990) (noting that the simultaneous
filing of complaints and consent orders had ended in 1974 but resumed in the 1980s); Sullivan,
supra note 142, at 1041 (outlining the consent decree process and noting that consent decrees
are usually filed at the same time as complaints).
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parties, it lets one claim victory, etc.—one has to rely principally on
the good faith of the enforcers to avoid cheap settlements of either
lawful or unlawful mergers. Reliance on that good faith is usually well
founded, but it leaves this part of the system open to charges of pork-
barreling.145 The agencies are aware of the problems, and have taken
significant steps to increase transparency.146 Although private interests
have sought to comment on settlements and to provide a healthy
check on they system,147 the system is still based significantly on trust.
Merger regulation as an agency process also makes the legal
standards less reliably lasting. Whereas the per se rule/rule of reason
has benefited from a parade of private and government merger cases,
the Supreme Court has not decided a merger antitrust case since
1974.148 Merger law, as practitioners think of it, differs radically from
the Supreme Court cases still on the books; the agencies, through
guidelines and enforcement decisions, and the few lower court
decisions, have simply moved away from Supreme Court standards.149
At least in theory, nothing would prevent new agency leaders from
taking office and pushing a radically more aggressive enforcement
agenda.150 The existence of private merger litigation would have
prevented this by keeping court standards consistent with agency
standards.
145. See Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & ECON. 329, 342 (1982)
(suggesting that FTC actions may be responsive to budget-maximizing interests and
congressional influence).
146. Among the clearest statements of agency thinking occurred when the FTC closed its
cruise ships investigation. See In re Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., FTC File No. 021-0041 (Oct.
4, 2002) (stating theories pursued and reasons action was not taken), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0210041.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
147. Commenting on government enforcement is among the purposes of the American
Antitrust Institute. See American Antitrust Institute, at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org (last
modified Aug. 22, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
148. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 641–42 (1974) (affirming
judgment for defendants in the last Supreme Court antitrust merger case).
149. See Federal, State, International Enforcers Update Participants at ABA Spring Meeting,
84 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 336, 340 (Apr. 11, 2003) (describing how FTC Chairman
Muris stressed the importance of the Supreme Court deciding a merger case because merger
case law is outdated).
150. See id. (highlighting, for example, FTC Chairman Muris’s concern that “‘the possibility
exists that there could be an attempt to return to a more simplistic and wrong application of
merger law’”).
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B. An Illustration: The Agencies and the Structured Rule of Reason
The story of the search for a middle category of antitrust analysis
started with the Antitrust Division. Currently, the FTC has the lead.
Key parts have been played by courts and academics. The ending is
unknown. In spite of that, the story serves as a good illustration of the
hallmarks of sound non-merger civil antitrust enforcement. Even
though an ultimate resolution has escaped realization, the exercise
has been widely viewed as legitimate and responsible, in part because
it has born the five hallmarks discussed herein.
The story began with the filing of a fairly simple complaint
alleging per se illegal price fixing.151 A society of engineers’ code of
ethics banned competitive bidding. The society responded to the
charge of per se (automatic) illegality by claiming, among other
things, that the practice was reasonable.152 The district court ruled that
reasonableness was not an issue where, as there, a defendant had
engaged in price fixing,153 and it adhered to this view after the
Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.154 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court, specifically approving use of the per se rule and holding
that the district court did not err when it refused to make factual
findings on the balancing of costs and benefits.155 In language hinting
151. United States v. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated
and remanded for further consideration, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975), on remand, 404 F. Supp. 457
(D.D.C. 1975), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff’d, 435 U.S.
679 (1978).
152. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 389 F. Supp. at 1197 (arguing that “learned professions”
are not subject to the antitrust laws and that the code was exempted by state regulation).
153. Id. at 1199.
154. United States v. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460–61 (D.D.C. 1975)
(referring to Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)). The Professional Engineers district court held that
the per se rule was not made inapplicable to professional organizations by Goldfarb. The
Goldfarb Court had written that:
[t]he fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context,
be treated differently.
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
155. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 555 F.2d at 982:
The Society is vexed because the district court did not make findings on its massive
evidence, including its 17 expert witnesses, filling the bulk of a joint appendix of
10,000 pages. There was no need for the district court to embark on protracted
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at the confusion that lay ahead, however, the court of appeals
approvingly noted that the district court “did not take the
[challenged] rule solely on its face” and condemned merely “an
unfortunate use of language. It assessed the rule by taking into
account how it had operated in fact, and with what practical anti-
competitive consequences.”156 In truth, however, although the district
court had found that the society had actively promoted its ethical
rules and discouraged competitive bidding,157 the court made no
finding about market power or changes in price, output, or quality: “It
is not important to know what effect the Sec. 11(c) prohibition has on
the price of professional engineering services.”158
The Supreme Court could have simply affirmed this use of the
per se rule (as requested by the solicitor general159), but it did not. In
response to the society’s argument that its rules were reasonably
addressed to the prevention of dangerously harmful price
competition, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, affirmed
“[b]ecause we are satisfied that the asserted defense rests on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the Rule of Reason.”160 The Court’s
Delphic opinion set out a classic distinguishing between the per se
rule and the rule of reason:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis.
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality—they are “illegal per
se.” In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect
can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business,
findings on matters that it considered, in the last analysis, to be unavailing as a
defense. Sound antitrust doctrine did not require a simulation of a “cost-benefit
ratio” analysis, or a “balancing” of the benefits accruing from competitive restraints
of this nature.
See also id. at 984 (holding that the district court correctly found the rule “illegal without regard
to claimed or possible benefits”).
156. Id. at 982.
157. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 389 F. Supp. at 1200 (“[T]he record does support a finding
that NSPE and its members actively pursue a course of policing adherence to the competitive
bid ban through direct and indirect communication with members and prospective clients.”).
158. Id. at 1120 (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)); see
also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 686 (1978) (“The District Court did not, however,
make any finding on the question whether, or to what extent, competition had led to inferior
engineering work which, in turn, had adversely affected the public health, safety, or welfare.”).
159. Brief for the United States at 35–37, Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679 (No. 76–
1767).
160. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 681.
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the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In
either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about
the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide
whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in
the interest of the members of an industry.161
The Court then coyly refrained from selecting between the two
approaches. By affirming a judgment applying the per se rule and
writing that the challenged agreement “[o]n its face . . . restrains
trade,”162 the opinion seems to apply the per se rule, but it nonetheless
weighs the society’s justification (and finds it wanting), while
repeatedly sketching the contours of the rule of reason.163 To this day
there is disagreement about whether Professional Engineers is a per
se or a rule of reason case164—or perhaps, as Justice Stevens queried
during oral argument in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,165 something
in between.166
The enigma of Professional Engineers launched more than two
decades of debate during which the antitrust system, like Diogenes
with his lamp, has sought answers to a thicket of challenging,
intricately related questions. Are there different rules? If so, how
does one decide which to apply? What can be presumed, and when?
What shortcuts may plaintiffs or defendants take?
Inevitably, the brightest landmarks along the way have been
provided by the Supreme Court.167 The most important decision, if
161. Id. at 692.
162. Id. at 693; see also id. at 692 (“While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.”).
163. Id. at 694 (noting that the possibility that competitive bidding may lead to suboptimal
results is not a reason to permit an agreement to eliminate it).
164. Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but Not the Full
Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 523 n.139 (2000) (citing differing views).
165. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
166. Transcript of Argument at 29, Cal. Dental Ass’n (No. 97-1625) (asking petitioner’s
counsel whether he viewed Professional Engineers as “a quick look case”).
167. Although overshadowed by the stature of the High Court, some of the most powerful
judicial analysis has, in fact, been contributed by Judges Bork, Easterbrook, and Posner, in a
quartet of cases issued on the heels of NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J.) (asserting that restraints ancillary to the existence of a joint venture are judged by the rule of
reason); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J.) (reasoning that a covenant not to compete between parties to a new venture was an ancillary
restraint that must be judged under the rule of reason); Vogel v. Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744
F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (“The Supreme Court has told us that before we leap
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only because it was first, was Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.168 There the Court reversed a Second
Circuit finding that a blanket copyright license was per se illegal price
fixing.169 The Court treated the label “price fixing” less as the
beginning of the analysis and more as the end: “‘price fixing’ is a
short-hand way of describing certain categories of business behavior
to which the per se rule has been held applicable.”170 Application of
the per se rule, the Court held, turns on “whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to
‘increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive.’”171 The test continues to be applied today.172
In another important private case, NCAA v. Board of Regents,173
the Court used the rule of reason to analyze (and condemn) an
agreement among colleges jointly to market television rights to
football games.174 In response to defendant’s insistence that it had no
market power, the Court ruled that “[a]s a matter of law, the absence
of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price
or output,”175 but it also concluded, nonetheless, that the NCAA had
market power.176
Two FTC cases round out the crucial entries to date.177 In FTC v.
Indiana Federation of Dentists,178 the Court upheld a Commission ban
to the conclusion that an agreement among competitors is price fixing we should take a quick
look to see whether it has clear anticompetitive consequences and lacks any redeeming
competitive virtues.”); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (“[I]f the elimination of competition is apparent on a quick look, without
undertaking the kind of searching inquiry that would make the case a Rule of Reason case in
fact if not in name, the practice is illegal per se.”).
168. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
169. Id. at 7, 18–20.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id. at 19–20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978)).
172. See, e.g., La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 332 F.3d 896, 906–
08 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the test to find a per se violation).
173. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
174. See id. at 98–107 (noting that horizontal restraints on competition are essential in the
industry, but that the anticompetitive consequences of the particular agreement are too great).
175. Id. at 109–10.
176. Id. at 111–13.
177. See also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding
that geographic market division between even potential competitors is per se illegal); FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 428–36 (1990) (declining to recognize a lack
of market power exception to politically expressive agreements among competitors to withhold
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of the Federation of Dentists’ refusal to make x-rays freely available
to insurers.179 Formal findings of market power were unnecessary
because ‘the absence of proof of market power does not justify a
naked restriction on price or output [which would] require[] some
competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis,’180 and because the Commission had adequately proven
“actual, sustained adverse effects on competition.”181 Most recently, in
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,182 the Court ruled that the Ninth
Circuit had permitted the FTC to take too quick a look at the
competitive effects flowing from a dental association’s ethical rules
purportedly directed at misleading advertising.183
Although the key landmarks are judicial, judges were not
operating as the only caretakers of the public interest. Academics
regularly sought to enlighten and advance the discourse, here with
pride of place being shared by then-Professor Bork, whose seminal
articles on the rule of reason184 underlay Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,185 and Professor Areeda, whose
initially obscure but seminal work made the “essential point” that
“the rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an
eye.”186
services unless prices were raised); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 354–
57 (1982) (4-3 decision) (applying the per se rule to an innovative agreement among physicians
to cap professional fees); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per
curiam) (“[W]hen a particular concerted activity [a horizontal agreement to eliminate credit]
entails an obvious risk of anticompetitive impact with no apparent potentially redeeming value,
the fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in a particular set of circumstances will not
prevent its being declared unlawful per se.”).
178. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
179. Id. at 465–66 (reversing the decision of the court of appeals).
180. Id. at 460 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984)).
181. Id. at 461.
182. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). The case is discussed in Calkins, supra note 164 (engaging in an
exhaustive review of the record and discussing implications of the case).
183. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 778 (“[T]he plausibility of competing claims about the
effects of the professional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently abbreviated review
to which the Commission’s order was treated.”).
184. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) (distinguishing between the “main tradition” and
“deviant themes” in the rule of reason); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 380–84 (1966) (endorsing
the doctrine of ancillary restraints).
185. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
186. PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL
ISSUES 38 (Federal Judicial Center 1981), quoted in Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 763; NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984).
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Additionally, throughout the entire period, and down to today,
the antitrust agencies were busily playing essential roles. Review of
the agencies’ activities during this saga reveals several key features:
(1) both the FTC and the Antitrust Division participated actively, (2)
using a wide array of tools, while (3) showing support for mainstream,
economics-based antitrust enforcement and an interest in addressing
important questions,187 (4) litigating, and (5) addressing legal
standards also being enforced by private parties.
1. Active Participation by Both Agencies. Although perhaps not
surprising given the centrality of antitrust to the intersection between
the per se rule and the rule of reason, it is nonetheless striking how
thoroughly both the FTC and the Antitrust Division have
participated in the development of this body of law. The seminal
Supreme Court case, Professional Engineers, was brought by the
Justice Department,188 but three of the most recent Supreme Court
cases featured the FTC as a party.189 Although the Justice Department
filed several amicus briefs on its own (Broadcast Music,190 Catalano,191
Maricopa County,192 Palmer v. BRG193), one of the most important
187. But cf. infra notes 219–220 (providing criticism suggesting insufficient attention
to economics).
188. 435 U.S. at 681.
189. See Cal. Dental Ass’n (vacating judgment that had enforced an FTC order against
dental association ethical rules regarding advertising); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that the lawyers' boycott of the practice of acting as court-
appointed counsel for indigent defendants was per se illegal); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986) (upholding FTC order against association rule discouraging supplying of x-rays
to dental insurers).
190. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (Nos. 77-1578, 77-1583) (asserting that blanket
licenses are not unlawful per se).
191. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (No. 79-1101) (arguing that the Court should consider summarily
reversing the lower court decision that erroneously concluded that an agreement to eliminate
competition in credit terms was not illegal per se).
192. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (No. 80-419) (asserting that arrangements among doctors that achieved
horizontal, maximum price fixing should be illegal per se at least unless defendants show that
the restrictions are necessary to procompetitive benefits). Further enriching the discussion, an
individual state and a group of states filed their own amicus briefs supporting their sister state.
Brief for the State of Ohio as Amicus Curiae, Maricopa County Med. Soc’y (No. 80-419); Brief
for the States of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae, Maricopa County Med. Soc’y (No. 80-419). A
group of states also filed an amicus brief supporting the FTC in California Dental Ass’n. Brief of
the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae, Cal. Dental Ass’n (No. 97-1625).
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early advocacies of a structured rule of reason was in the
government’s amicus brief in NCAA, in which the Justice
Department and the FTC both joined.194
At times, the agencies have experimented with differing
approaches. In 1988, the FTC, building upon the approach taken in
the NCAA amicus brief, set out an elegant set of decisional questions
that guided its analysis in In re Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Optometry,195 with the opening question being “whether the restraint
is ‘inherently suspect.’”196 Later that same year, the Antitrust Division
set forth its own somewhat differently structured list of queries.197
Eight years later, the FTC gave Massachusetts Board a quiet burial
when it failed to apply it in its California Dental Ass’n opinion,198 only
to see Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein publicly advocate a
“stepwise approach” that was strikingly similar to Massachusetts
Board.199 The agencies joined together once again to issue Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors.200 The story,
however, continues with separate initiatives, as is discussed below.
193. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46
(1990) (No. 89-1667) (urging the Court summarily to reverse the lower court decision that held
the per se rule inapplicable to an agreement designed to end competition).
194. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (No. 83-271) (authored by, among other, Assistant Attorney General J. Paul McGrath
and FTC General Counsel John H. Carley) (asserting that a rule of reason analysis supports the
affirmance of the lower court’s holding that a television broadcasting plan violates the Sherman
Act).
195. 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988); see id. at 604 (providing a structured series of questions for
analyzing horizontal restraints).
196. Id.
197. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations—1998, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,109.10, at 20,600 (Nov. 10, 1988) (describing a four-step analysis, starting with
whether a proposed joint venture “would likely have any anticompetitive effect” in its
market(s)).  These Guidelines were replaced by revised Guidelines. Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations—1995, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,107 (April 6,
1995).
198. In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 321 & n.26 (1996) (finding the result “not
inconsistent” with Massachusetts Board); see Timothy J. Muris, The Rule of Reason After
California Dental, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 528–29 (2000) (“In [Cal. Dental Ass’n] however,
Chairman Pitofsky attempted to revive per se/rule of reason categorization. . . . This approach
proved to be incorrect.”).
199. See Joel I. Klein, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements,
Address Before the ABA Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program (Nov. 7, 1996), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jikaba.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(discussing various approaches to analyzing whether a practice is in violation of antitrust laws).
200. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,160 (Apr. 7, 2000).
CALKINS.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
710 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:673
2. Using a Wide Array of Tools. As already intimated, the
agencies have addressed these challenging issues using a variety of
tools. Both agencies have litigated cases, the Antitrust Division in the
federal courts and the FTC administratively. Both agencies have filed
amicus briefs. Both have given speeches.
Most ambitiously, in 1997, the agencies embarked upon a major
“Joint Venture Project.”201 Testimony was taken and roundtables with
scores of participants were held.202 Massive staff papers were prepared
on the role of market power and “the search for a foreshortened
antitrust analysis.”203 Eventually—and one would guess after the
agencies deliberately waited for the Supreme Court to issue its
California Dental Ass’n opinion—the agencies published guidelines in
draft204 and final form.205
The guidelines have not been an unqualified success: they
endured a painfully long gestation process,206 their emergence was
201. See Comment and Hearings on Joint Venture Project (Apr. 22, 1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/04/jointven.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (inviting public
comment on issues to be addressed in the Joint Venture Project).
202. Information is available at the Joint Venture Project website, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
203. William E. Cohen, Per Se Illegality and Truncated Rule of Reason: The Search for a
Foreshortened Antitrust Analysis, FTC Policy Planning Staff Discussion Draft (Nov. 1997), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/1Persepap.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing
a review and appraisal of “alternative formulations for application” of the per se analysis); see
Michael S. McFalls, The Role and Assessment of Classical Market Power in Joint Venture
Analysis, FTC Policy Planning Staff Discussion Draft (Oct. 1997), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/classic8.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reviewing
the role of market power analysis). Although nominally only for purposes of discussion, the
Cohen draft was quoted in litigation by FTC complaint counsel as recently as the fall of 2002.
Answering Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint in Support of the Initial Decision at 10,
30, In re Polygram Holding, Inc., No. 9298 (FTC Sept. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9298/020911answerbrief.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
204. FTC and DOJ Propose Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/10/jointven.htm (Oct. 1, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal);
see Susan S. DeSanti, Guideposts in the Analysis: The Federal Trade Commission and U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, Remarks
Before the Houston Bar Ass'n (Dec. 7, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/
houstonspeech.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reviewing draft guidelines and inviting
comments); Robert Pitofsky, Joint Venture Guidelines: Views from One of the Drafters,
Remarks Before an ABA Antitrust Section Workshop (Nov. 11–12, 1999), at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitof sky/jvg991111.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(reviewing the history and structure of the draft guidelines).
205. Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶13,161, at 20,851 (Apr. 7, 2000).
206. Pitofsky, supra note 204 (“A major theme that I hope many of you subscribe to is the
following: better late than never.”).
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greeted with mixed reviews,207 few courts cited them,208 they receive
varying play in some leading antitrust books,209 and sophisticated
practitioners rarely consult them for definitive answers to hard
questions.210
Nonetheless, the guidelines have made a significant contribution.
A new casebook describes them as “the most ambitious effort to
synthesize” this area of law.211 Neophytes consult them, and even
sophisticated practitioners use them to stimulate thinking and
illustrate points. Citations to them can be found in scores of law
review articles.
Most significantly, in terms of the agencies and law development,
the guidelines provided a ready vehicle for the agencies to respond to
the setback in California Dental Ass’n. In California Dental Ass’n, the
FTC, in an opinion authored by noted scholar and Chairman Robert
Pitofsky, condemned a dental association’s advertising restraints by
using the per se rule and by taking a “quick look under the rule of
reason.”212 The factual record is murky, because it turned on the
207. See Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association on the
“Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors” Issued in Draft on October 1,
1999, by the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice (Feb. 4, 2000 draft)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (asserting that the guidelines
defined competitor collaboration too broadly, gave too much sweep to the per se rule, were
excessively strict in application of the rule of reason, were in tension with other guidelines, and
failed to address important issues); Letter from Robert H. Lande, Director and Senior Research
Scholar, American Antitrust Institute, to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, FTC, (Feb. 4, 2000), at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/53.cfm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“AAI
Comments on New FTC/DOJ Collaboration Guidelines”) (clarifying that the American
Antitrust Institute applauds the guidelines but offers suggestions for improvements); Janet L.
McDavid and Mary Anne Mason, Competitor Collaboration Guidelines: Delphic Messages
from the Antitrust Agencies, Remarks before an ABA Antitrust Section Program, Joint
Ventures and Strategic Alliances: The New Federal Antitrust Competitor Collaboration
Guidelines (Nov. 11–12, 1999), at 2 (noting that “the draft guidelines are more generic and less
utilitarian than . . . predecessor efforts”).
208. They have been cited only in Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2003); A.D.
Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2001), and Paladin
Associates, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. See, e.g., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 78–79 (discussing
enforcement agencies' approaches with respect to FTC and DOJ Intellectual Property
Guidelines); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 407–08 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining
the substance of the guidelines); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 236–92 (5th ed. 2003)
(discussing the meaning and scope of the rule without mentioning the guidelines).
210. This conclusion is based on a series of interviews by the author.
211. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 200 (2002).
212. In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 320 (1996).
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enforcement as well as the wording of the association’s ethical
addressing advertising, but the Commission found that the association
had substantially interfered with the advertising of discounts and with
the making of quality claims.213 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, because
California Dental Association’s justification, “preventing false and
misleading price advertising,” did not “require[] more than a quick
look under the rule of reason.”214 The Supreme Court reversed
through a 5-4 opinion by Justice Souter that held that “a less quick
look was required.”215 The Court treated the question of the legal
standard as one of law, and concluded that the Ninth Circuit had been
too willing to defer to the Commission’s use of the “quick look.”216
The opinion is singularly enigmatic, and is susceptible of being read as
a powerful attack on anything that could be considered “burden
shifting.”217
The Joint Venture Project provided a ready vehicle for an agency
response and interpretation. The guidelines preserve a substantial
role for the per se rule, carefully preventing any facile escape from its
coverage.218 They also preserve, even for restraints not subject to the
213. Id. at 301; see Calkins, supra note 164, at 500–02 (reviewing the Commission’s opinions
in Cal. Dental Ass’n).
214. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 756
(1999).
215. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
216. See id. at 778 (finding that the Ninth Circuit’s review of the Commission’s order was
“indulgently abbreviated”); Calkins, supra note 164, at 503–05 (reviewing court opinions).
217. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 775 n.12:
The point is that before a theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects can justify
shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of procompetitive
effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires, there must be some indication that
the court making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for the
anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually are anticompetitive.
(emphasis added).
California Dental Ass’n has been considered a “troublesome opinion.” Clark C.
Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 939, 953 (2001). Some observers wish that the FTC trial team in California Dental Ass’n
had introduced additional evidence. See Lawrence J. White, Antitrust During the Clinton
Administration: An Assessment, in HIGH STAKES ANTITRUST: THE LAST HURRAH? AEI-
BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES (Robert Hahn ed., forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 11, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that Cal. Dental Ass’n was a
missed opportunity); Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal
Trade Commission: In a Word—Continuity, Prepared Remarks before the ABA Antitrust
Section Annual Meeting (Aug. 7, 2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (asserting that the FTC would have prevailed under the
Massachusetts Board standard with evidence explaining why a truncated approach was
appropriate).
218. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,161, at 20,855 (Apr. 7, 2000) (Guidelines Section 3.2):
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per se rule, an important role for a mid-level form of analysis
potentially capable of condemning restraints without proof of market
power or actual anticompetitive effects.219 California Dental Ass’n was
almost casually folded into the analysis.
3. Addressing Important Questions from a Position of
Mainstream, Economics-Based Antitrust. The antitrust community is
not populated by shrinking violets. From time to time, decisions,
actions, motives, and even sanity have been vigorously questioned.
Although some fret that the increasingly regulatory nature of the
practice may have chilled dissenters, so many strong personalities
have played important roles that disagreement has always been easy
to stimulate.
Because of that, it is striking how little ill will has been
engendered by the lengthy struggle over the proper role and form of
the per se/rule of reason/mid-level approaches. Articles, opinions,
briefs, and guidelines bear the names of Phil Areeda, William Baxter,
Agreements of a type that always or almost always tends to raise price or reduce
output are per se illegal. . . . Types of agreements that have been held per se illegal
include agreements among competitors to fix prices or output, rig bids, or share or
divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce
. . . .
If, however, participants in an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic
activity enter into an agreement that is reasonably related to the integration and
reasonably necessary to achieve its procompetitive benefits, the Agencies analyze the
agreement under the rule of reason . . . .
(footnotes omitted).
219. Id. at 20,856 (Guidelines Section 3.3):
Under the rule of reason, the Agencies’ analysis begins with an examination of the
nature of the relevant agreement, since the nature of the agreement determines the
types of anticompetitive harms that may be of concern. . . . If the nature of the
agreement and the absence of market power together demonstrate the absence of
anticompetitive harm, the Agencies do not challenge the agreement. Alternatively,
where the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the
agreement, or anticompetitive harm has resulted from an agreement already in
operation, then, absent overriding benefits that could offset the anticompetitive harm,
the Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed market analysis.
(citation and footnotes omitted). Of course, not every commentator applauds this attempted
preservation of a mid-level scrutiny. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A
Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 359–62 (2000)
(“[F]or restraints other than those the Court has previously condemned under a per se rule or an
abbreviated rule of reason, the only safe course is to engage in an extensive inquiry . . . in short,
the full-blown version of the rule of reason.”); Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look:
Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 464 (2000)
(“[T]he quick look is an artifact of a bygone Populist era . . . [and developments in economic
theory and historical research] suggest that courts should accord full-blown rule of reason
treatment to any restraint that is plausibly procompetitive.”).
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Robert Bork, Stephen Breyer, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas
Ginsburg, Joel Klein, Douglas Melamed, Timothy Muris, Robert
Pitofsky, Richard Posner, and Charles “Rick” Rule, but the writings
all evince the shared respect of people of substance striving to
accomplish the common good.
Another striking feature is that the state attorneys general have
played only a very minor role. There are no NAAG competitor
collaboration guidelines. One does not see innovative consent orders
that push the envelope on when horizontal agreements should be
presumptively unlawful. The state attorneys general have filed the
occasional timely and supportive amicus brief, but have not been
major participants on this front.
Both phenomena—relative harmony and the modest role of
NAAG—can be explained in part by the nature of the agencies’
project. This is important stuff. The per se rule/rule of reason tension
is at the heart of antitrust. No one can suggest that an agency
pursuing these issues is off on a frolic. Rather, the story is one of two
agencies led by leaders of varying perspectives, working in good faith
to promote legitimate enforcement and resolve one of antitrust’s
central conundrums.
If there has been a failing, it may have been in making economics
or empiricism insufficiently central to the enterprise. Economics plays
a key role in the antitrust agencies, as it should.220 Economics has
informed much of the agencies’ thinking about these per se/rule of
reason issues.221 The Commission has been faulted for insufficiently
introducing economics evidence during the California Dental Ass’n
proceeding.222 Certainly the Court perceived that there had been an
insufficiently searching examination of the situation,223 so perhaps
220. See Kirkpatrick II, supra note 129, at 96–104 (discussing the role of economic analysis
in the FTC’s programs and research); see also Jonathan B. Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory
Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 869 (1997) (“[T]he
Commission has created an organizational structure and information-gathering process that
involves economists in every stage of substantive decisionmaking.”).
221. See James L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia, Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Restraint Cases: An Economic Perspective, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 684–85 (1993) (asserting that
the Commission's approach and the economic theories explaining such an approach may help
separate anticompetitive from efficient conduct).
222. See Muris, supra note 198, at 538 (“[I]n [Cal. Dental Ass’n], the complaint counsel did
not even bother to have an economist testify.”).
223. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999) (“[T]he absence of any
empirical evidence on this point [whether the restrictions’ virtues offset any anticompetitive
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additional attention to economic evidence might have helped gain
that fifth vote. Regardless of whether that particular setback could
have been avoided, the overall record is one of addressing important
questions from a mainstream, economics-based perspective.
4. Litigating. The per se/rule of reason tension serves as a
terrific illustration of the importance of government antitrust
litigation. Government litigation has been important: (a) for
evolution of legal doctrine, (b) for certainty and predictability, (c)
because some cases are wrongly decided, and (d) as a foundation for
and disciplining of agency actions.224
a. Evolution of Legal Doctrine. The per se/rule of reason
tension would be a better illustration of government litigation leading
to the healthy evolution of legal doctrine if California Dental Ass’n
had achieved a harmonious resolution. Thankfully, the agencies
remained in the business of adjudicating these issues. The recent
issuance of its unanimous opinion in In re Polygram Holding, Inc.225
has given the FTC another chance to contribute to doctrinal
development.
The case arose after Polygram and Warner had agreed jointly to
produce and market a Paris 1998 album by the Three Tenors (and
possibly a greatest hits album or a boxed set), but very shortly into
the project there arose concerns that discounting of PolyGram’s 1990
album or Warner’s 1994 album might undermine sales.226 Accordingly,
Polygram and Warner entered into a “moratorium agreement”
promising not to advertise or discount their older Three Tenors
albums during the ten-week period in which the 1998 album initially
effects] indicates that the question was not answered, merely avoided by implicit burden shifting
. . . .”).
224. See Calkins, supra note 138 (reviewing the benefits of government agencies litigating
antitrust cases).
225. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 15,453, at 22,446 (F.T.C. July 24, 2003).
226. Id. at 22,451. Attempts to develop such distinctive new repertoire had not succeeded.
Warner executive Anthony O’Brien explained:
“[T]he problem that we had was that The Three Tenors [are] perhaps three of the
laziest performers we have ever seen performing this type of music, and what we were
hoping for . . . was to have new and exciting repertoire. . . And they’re not particularly
given to sort of learning new arias, and so Nessun dorma! would come back again, or
maybe Carreras would sing one of the Pavarotti songs or vice versa.”
In re Polygram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, slip op. at 22 (F.T.C. June 20, 2002) (initial decision),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 2002/06/polygramid.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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would be sold.227 Administrative Law Judge James P. Timony found
that the moratorium was illegal per se and under an abbreviated rule
of reason.228
It was almost a foregone conclusion that the FTC, led by the
leading advocate of the Massachusetts Board approach,229 would adopt
some version of that structured form of inquiry. After the
Commission in California Dental Ass’n had departed from
Massachusetts Board in favor of what then-Professor Muris described
as the per se/rule of reason “categorization” approach—and even
before the Supreme Court had handed the Commission its California
Dental Ass’n defeat—Muris wrote that “[w]ithin the Commission,
whether emphasis on categorization will continue or not depends on
the Commission leadership, particularly the Chairman and Bureau
Director.”230 Once Muris became chairman of a collegial, majority
Republican Commission with no members from the California Dental
Ass’n Commission remaining,231 it was clear that some form of
Massachusetts Board would return. The Polygram opinion did not
disappoint this expectation.
Polygram adopted a structured form of analysis obviously
descended from but not identical to Massachusetts Board.
Massachusetts Board asked three fairly simple questions set out
below. Polygram is more complicated.
In Massachusetts Board, “[f]irst, we ask whether the restraint is
‘inherently suspect.’ In other words, is the practice the kind that
appears likely, absent an efficiency justification, to ‘restrict
competition and decrease output’?”232 Polygram similarly, if
somewhat less precisely, requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate[] that
227. Polygram, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 22,451.
228. Polygram, No. 9298, slip op. at 75–77.
229. FTC Chairman Muris has defended the Massachusetts Board approach in Muris, supra
note 198, at 531–32, 536–39; Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade
Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 265, 304–09 (2000);
Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of
Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (1998) [hereinafter Muris, In Defense]; Timothy J.
Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859 (1989).
230. Muris, In Defense, supra note 229, at 798–99.
231. See 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9562, at 16,452 (Aug. 6, 2003) (showing that five
Commissioners were appointed in 1997 or later).
232. In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988) (quoting
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979).
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the conduct at issue is inherently suspect owing to its likely tendency
to suppress competition.”233
Massachusetts Board’s “second question” asks, “Is there a
plausible efficiency justification for the practice? . . . Such an
efficiency defense is plausible if it cannot be rejected without
extensive factual inquiry.”234 Here, Polygram is more demanding. An
“inherently suspect” practice can be defended “only by advancing a
legitimate justification for those practices.”235 Although “the
defendant need only articulate” this justification, “the proffered
justifications must be both cognizable under the antitrust laws and at
least facially plausible.”236 As in Massachusetts Board, “[a]
justification is plausible if it cannot be rejected without extensive
factual inquiry.”237 But the defendant “must articulate the specific link
between the challenged restraint and the purported justification.”238
In Massachusetts Board, if a justification is “plausible,” a “third
inquiry . . . determine[s] whether the justification is really valid.”239 If
it is, the restraint is evaluated under the full rule of reason analysis.
Again, Polygram is more demanding. If a defendant “advances” a
legitimate justification, “the plaintiff must make a more detailed
showing that the restraints at issue are indeed likely, in the particular
context, to harm competition. Such a showing still need not prove
actual anticompetitive effects or entail ‘the fullest market analysis.’”240
The showing “may or may not require evidence about the particular
233. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 15,453, at 22,458 (F.T.C. July 24, 2003) (“Such conduct
ordinarily encompasses behavior that past judicial experience and current economic learning
have shown to warrant summary condemnation.”). A showing that conduct is “inherently
suspect” is required by a plaintiff seeking to “avoid full rule of reason analysis, including the
pleading and proof of market power.” Id. Unlike Massachusetts Board, Polygram also explicitly
reserved a role for the per se rule for “cases with no possible arguments that restraints are
needed to achieve beneficial results.” Id. at 22,466 n.66 (“Such matters are commonly the
subject of criminal prosecution and are appropriately deemed per se illegal, as are other
restraints for which the proffered justifications can likewise be dismissed summarily.”).
234. 110 F.T.C. at 604.
235. Polygram, 5 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) at 22,458.
236. Id. at 22,458–59. Although Polygram and Warner Communications, like all persons
against whom FTC administrative complaints are filed, are technically “respondents” rather
than “defendants,” see id. at 22,448, and the complaint is prosecuted by “complaint counsel”
rather than “plaintiffs,” see id. at 22,451, the Commission phrased its test in terms of the more
familiar “defendants” and “plaintiffs,” and those terms will be used herein as well.
237. Id. at 22,459.
238. Id.
239. 110 F.T.C. at 604.
240. Polygram, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 22,459 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (footnote omitted)).
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market at issue, but at a minimum must entail the identification of the
theoretical basis for the alleged anticompetitive effects and a showing
that the effects are indeed likely to be anticompetitive.”241 It could “be
based on a more detailed analysis of economic learning about the
likely competitive effects of a particular restraint,” on a showing “that
the proffered procompetitive effects could be achieved through
means less restrictive of competition.”242 Most notably, if the plaintiff
“address[es] the justification, and provide[s] the tribunal with
sufficient evidence to show that anticompetitive effects are in fact
likely,” then “the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant.”243
Note how much tougher Polygram is than Massachusetts Board.
In Massachusetts Board, a “plausible” justification was sufficient.
Now, only a “legitimate” one will suffice, i.e., one that is both
“plausible” and “cognizable.” In Massachusetts Board, finding a
justification “plausible” leaves only one remaining inquiry—whether
the justification is “valid”—with a positive answer triggering the full
rule of reason. In Polygram, a finding of legitimacy results in a more
detailed inquiry, but that inquiry can focus exclusively on theory and
need not necessarily include evidence about the market at issue. It is
not clear that the full rule of reason ever would be found to apply.
Whether or not Polygram will be upheld on appeal, and whether
or not its particular approach will prevail over time at the
Commission or in the courts, the litigation has already contributed to
the development of doctrine by focusing attention on a series of
challenging issues. The briefs and the oral argument before the
Commission found talented lawyers joining issue on several of the
issues left uncertain by California Dental Ass’n—ancillarity, inference
of competitive effects, the context for evaluating restraints, and the
standard for evaluating procompetitive justifications. These issues,
and the Commission’s resolution of same, justify careful attention.
First, for an otherwise problematic restraint to avoid the per se
rule, it must have some relation to something like legitimate
integration.244 Complaint counsel would have limited this to where a
241. Id.
242. Id. at 22,459–60.
243. Id. at 22,460 (“At this stage, the defendant’s burden to respond will likely depend in
individual cases upon the quality and amount of evidence that the plaintiff has produced . . . .”).
The Commission noted that the “plaintiff has the burden of persuasion overall, but not
necessarily the burden with respect to each step of this analysis.” Id.
244. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (holding that
agreement among doctors on prices was illegal per se where arrangement was “not analogous to
CALKINS.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
2003] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 719
restraint is “necessary to facilitate the procompetitive integration.”245
Respondents championed a more permissive standard: “the restraint
needs to be reasonably related to the integration,”246 which is satisfied
if the restraint “furthers the efficiency and success of a legitimate joint
venture.”247 On the narrow issue of wording, the Commission
subscribed to the “reasonably necessary” language.248 Purported
benefits from restraints of competition in products outside the scope
of a venture were not “cognizable,” to use the wording of the
Polygram structured analysis.249 More fundamentally, the Commission
explained that no test could bless every restraint of competition that
aided a venture, lest naked price fixing be justified as a way of
achieving resources needed for some social good.250
Second, for cases not triggering the per se rule, respondents read
California Dental Ass’n as requiring a showing of anticompetitive
effects or the presence of market power before there is any burden of
justification.251 Complaint counsel disagreed, arguing that “courts
infer competitive injury from the existence of the inherently suspect
agreement.”252 The Commission sided with complaint counsel, and,
indeed, seemingly would not require proof of competitive effects even
partnerships or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors
pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit”).
245. Answering Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint in Support of the Initial
Decision at 51, In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 15,453 (F.T.C. July 24,
2003) (No. 9298).
246. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 13, Polygram (No. 9298).
247. Id. at 16.
248. Polygram, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 22,465 (“A determination of ancillarity
includes, of course, the factual inquiry whether a particular restraint was indeed reasonably
necessary to permit the parties to achieve a particular efficiency.”).
249. Id. at 22,462–63.
250. Id. at 22,464–65. During oral argument, the Commissioners seemed uncomfortable with
respondents’ proposal, with Chairman Muris asking a question inspired by complaint counsel’s
brief: In the General Motors-Toyota joint venture, “[i]f they had agreed to restrict competition
from similar General Motors and Toyota cars . . . would that be the kind of restriction that
would be treated the same way under your analysis?” Transcript of Oral Arguments at 17,
Polygram (No. 9298); see Complaint Counsel’s Brief at 52 n.60, Polygram (No. 9298) (pointing
to the approved joint venture as “illustrating the distinction between restraints upon products
inside versus outside the venture”).
251. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 31, Polygram (No. 9298); see also Transcript of Oral
Arguments at 5 (“[U]nder the rule of reason, any version of the rule of reason, the plaintiff . . .
is required to make at least some showing of anticompetitive effect.”); id. at 77 (“You cannot
put the burden on the defendant to show actual procompetitive effect unless there’s a showing
of actual anticompetitive effect . . . .”).
252. Complaint Counsel’s Brief at 14.
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for suspect restraints for which the respondent has a
“legitimate justification.”253
Third, respondents argued that it would be error to consider the
anticompetitive consequences of the restraints alone, without regard
to the larger venture;254 complaint counsel disagreed.255 The
Commission’s principal basis for decision was to side with complaint
counsel and rule that restraints outside a larger venture cannot be
justified by procompetitive benefits flowing from that venture.
Fourth, respondents argued that even if a presumption of
anticompetitive effect is allowed, respondent can answer by pointing
merely to a “‘plausible’ procompetitive justification”; thereafter, the
burden should be on complaint counsel to prove net anticompetitive
effects.256 Complaint counsel strenuously objected that respondents
must show not only plausibility but “validity as well, and if you don’t
put that burden upon the respondents, then you don’t have truncated
analysis.”257 The Commission chose to require not explicit “validity”
(the Massachusetts Board term), but much more than
mere plausibility.
253. Commissioner questions during oral argument evinced some discomfort with complaint
counsel’s position, with Commissioner Leary asking, “is it right even under a burden-shifting
analysis to say that the commission can say something is inherently suspect based on evidence
that is not necessarily directly related to the practice in issue and then put a burden on the
parties to be more specific than the commission has been in bringing its own case?” Transcript
of Oral Arguments at 69. See also id. (“Neither party here has, quite frankly, a great deal of
empirical evidence on what the impact of this restraint was. Is it right to put a higher burden of
specificity on the respondent?”); id. at 70 (“I’m just concerned about the fact that burden-
shifting means the Commission gets away with waving its hand and saying ‘inherently suspect’
and they can’t say ‘reasonably related’ in response.”).
254. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 47–49.
255. See Transcript of Oral Arguments at 41 (“The price-fixing agreement—and this
distinction is critical—applied to products that were separate from the joint venture, that were
created prior to the joint venture . . . .”).
256. Respondents’ Opening Brief at 42 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771
(1999)).
257. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 73; see also Complaint Brief at 27 (“Respondents must
show that the moratorium was necessary in order to promote competition and benefit
consumers.”); id. at 27–28:
Respondents assert that a plausible efficiency theory alone—without evidence
showing that the theory applies in the instant case—triggers the need for a full rule of
reason review. App. 50. This precept would return antitrust analysis to the days of the
strict per se/rule of reason dichotomy, with abbreviated analysis surviving in name
only. Under Respondents’ mistaken view of the law, abbreviated analysis would
govern only where a defendant’s attorneys and experts are too hapless to utter the
words “free riding,” or otherwise fail to assert any efficiency rationale . . . .
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Polygram’s parent, Vivendi Universal, has announced that it will
appeal the Commission’s decision.258 That appeal, regardless of its
outcome, offers the prospect of clarifying these central and perplexing
antitrust issues.259
b. Certainty and Predictability. Again, addressing this subject
after the Ninth Circuit had upheld the Commission on California
Dental Ass’n, one could reassuringly write that certainty and
predictability were increasing. California Dental Ass’n put an end to
that. Continued litigation, however, has now provided new hope that
certainty and predictability will be enhanced. Clarification of the law
is more likely when issues are squarely joined.
c. Cases May Be Wrongly Decided. Government agencies do
not lightly decide to litigate. Resources are scarce, and experienced
258. David Ho, Recording Firms Meet Their Match, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney,
Australia), July 31, 2003, at 49.
259. The Commission’s actual holding—a horizontal agreement not to discount or advertise
products not included in a joint venture cannot avoid condemnation by pointing to benefits to
the venture, at least where those benefits are not necessary to the achievement of the venture’s
procompetitive benefits, In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,453, at
22,470 (F.T.C. July 24, 2003)—seems obviously correct and should be sustained on appeal.
Nonetheless, legitimate questions can be asked about the opinion.
The leading critic of Massachusetts Board attacked its use of the term “inherently
suspect,” because the Commission “never gave content” to the term and the term was
aggressively applied to “a broad range of situations.” Joseph Kattan, The Role of Efficiency
Consideration in the Federal Trade Commission’s Antitrust Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 613,
624–25 (1996). Although Polygram declares that “most cases” will require the full rule of
reason, and states that “inherently suspect” conduct “ordinarily encompasses behavior that past
judicial experience and current economic learning have shown to warrant summary
condemnation,” 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 22,458, it provides, if anything, even less content
to the term “inherently suspect” than Massachusetts Board did.
Although “inherently suspect” remains as imprecise a term as in Massachusetts Board,
the consequences of such categorization have become even more serious. It is not clear whether,
once conduct has been labeled “inherently suspect,” it can ever qualify for evaluation under the
full rule of reason. What the Commission has really done in Polygram is to attempt to create the
California Dental Ass’n-endorsed “sliding scale” that considers a specified series of factors to
use to judge seriously troubling behavior.
For better or worse, the Commission may have newly embarked on developing its own
jurisprudence for this middle category of restraints. No court ever relied upon the Commission’s
Massachusetts Board opinion, for instance. The Commission could have relied upon the leading
federal court mid-level scrutiny cases and fit within their language and structure. By choosing a
different approach, it enjoys the opportunity (subject to court review) to craft its own language
and analytical sequencing. Cf. Arthur, supra note 219, at 383–88 (advocating FTC-unique, mid-
level scrutiny). On the other hand, it may have sacrificed an opportunity to help easily shape
federal court doctrine.
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litigators even scarcer. This is evident from the Justice Department’s
retaining David Boies (and others) to work on Microsoft,260 but there
are other examples as well.261 Neither agencies nor individuals profit
from association with losing causes.262
Although California Dental Ass’n is a case that the FTC should
have won, in my biased view, the loss serves as a nice illustration of
the value of continued litigation. Litigating California Dental Ass’n
involved many risks, including the risk of making bad law. At best
one can say that California Dental Ass’n confused the law. But the
FTC is back adjudicating two other cases that provide vehicles for
clarifying and strengthening the law. Well-placed confidence that
there could promptly be future cases makes more acceptable the
inevitable risk-taking of litigation.
California Dental Ass’n also offers proof that problematic cases
attract criticism. As of this writing, the case has been discussed in
more than 125 law review articles, as well as in countless speeches and
programs.263 Its strengths and weaknesses have been thoroughly
reviewed, and pathways to improvements have been suggested from
the right and from the left.264 Nothing an agency can do—not consent
orders, or speeches, or guidelines—attracts the detailed scrutiny
accorded to major judicial decisions. Wrong decisions in other venues
may be glossed over or left unchallenged (and uncorrected) for
decades; wrong decisions by major courts attract immediate and
potentially corrective notice.265
260. See Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact—Revised at 875, United States v.
Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1233) (listing David Boies as “Special Trial
Counsel”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2600/vii-e.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
261. For instance, Melvin H. Orlans from the FTC general counsel’s office was assigned to
work on trying a recent Commission antitrust case. See Appeal Brief of Counsel Supporting the
Complaint at 91, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 FTC LEXIS 40 (initial decision
June 27, 2002) (listing counsel), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/scheringtrialbrief.pdf
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
262. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role
of Entry in Merger Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 365–71 (1997) (describing the harm caused
by some key defeats).
263. This was determined through a search of the Lexis database search, Antitrust Law
Journal file and U.S. & Canadian Law Reviews, Combined file (August 6, 2003) (“California
Dental & FTC”).
264. See, e.g., Symposium: The Future Course of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 331
(2000) (offering six perspectives on the rule of reason).
265. For instance, the Commission has communicated views on price discrimination through
a variety of means, including formal guides on merchandising payments and services. Federal
Trade Commission Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
CALKINS.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
2003] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 723
d. Litigation as a Foundation for, and Disciplining of, Agency
Action. There is nothing like litigation to keep one honest and
provide a dose of reality. When in the 1980s the Justice Department
drafted vertical restraint guidelines, knowing there was no meaningful
chance it would be bringing a vertical case, it was almost an academic
exercise—and, in part because of that, the guidelines received little
acceptance.266 In contrast, when in the 1990s the agencies added an
expanded efficiencies defense to their merger guidelines, the drafting
was informed and chastened by the prospect of litigation.267
So also, the experience with and prospect of future litigation
informed and disciplined the agencies’ drafting of the competitor
collaboration guidelines.268 Critics suggest that litigation fears made
Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240 (2003). Since these are nonbinding, one cannot be sure whether the
guides, last revised in 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,651 (1990), are good law.
In comparison, when the Commission communicated its views on buyer liability for price
discrimination through an adjudicative opinion affirmed by a court of appeals, the Supreme
Court promptly reversed that lower court. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 85
(1979). That opinion is routinely consulted to this day. See, e.g., ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 514 (beginning its discussion of buyer liability with Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea).
266. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; Alan A. Fisher et al., Do the DOJ Vertical
Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 641 (1987) (“[Guidelines]
only minimally affected private and state cases.”). As Assistant Attorney General Bingman
explained when announcing the withdrawal of the Guidelines:
They were controversial from the outset; even beyond the norm for antitrust. Within
the year, Congress expressed its “sense” that the Vertical Restraints Guidelines: (1)
were not an accurate expression of federal antitrust law or of Congressional intent;
(2) should not be accorded any force of law or be treated by the courts as binding or
persuasive, and (3) should be recalled by the Attorney General.
Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Address to the ABA’s Antitrust Section, in 65
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 250, 251 (Aug. 12, 1993); see also George A. Hay, The
Effect of GTE Sylvania on Antitrust Jurisprudence: Observations: Sylvania in Retrospect, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 61, 65 (1991) (referring casually to the “notorious DOJ Vertical Restraints
Guidelines”).
267. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 13,104, at 20,569 (April 8, 1997); see also William Blumenthal, Clear Agency Guidelines:
Lessons from 1982, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 14–20 (2000) (stating that the 1982 Merger Guidelines
succeed in part because they had credibility from substantial adherence to case law yet “fairly
portrayed contemporary government enforcement policy”). Of course, some commentators and
even sitting Commissioners have complained that, perhaps out of fear of litigation consequence,
the guidelines are too restrictive. See, e.g., Thomas B. Leary, Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story
of Ongoing Evolution, Remarks Before the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/efficienciesandantitrust.htm (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (pointing to ways in which he would be more receptive than current
Guidelines to efficiency claims).
268. See, e.g., Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.1 n.15, 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,161, at 20,851 (Apr. 7, 2000) (noting Commission defeat in Cal.
Dental Ass’n during a discussion of policy background).
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the agencies too cautious,269 but the disciplining prospect of having to
stand behind espoused standards in litigation makes the drafting
prospect more serious and ultimately more legitimate.
A recent example of the disciplining effect of litigation was
provided by the Justice Department’s lawsuit against LSL
Biotechnologies.270 The Antitrust Division’s single-count complaint
charged that a covenant not to compete in the long-shelf-life tomato
business, which was included in the document dissolving a joint
venture, violated section 1 because the covenant “was not reasonably
necessary to effectuate the contemplated transaction . . . or achieve
integration efficiencies.”271 The district court quoted from the line of
cases indicating that plaintiffs must allege either per se or rule of
reason violations, and “[i]f the restraint is not alleged to be a per se
violation, the plaintiff must establish the ‘relevant market’ affected by
the alleged restraint.”272 The government having failed sufficiently to
establish a relevant market (and implicitly having failed to allege a
per se violation), the complaint was dismissed.273
On appeal the Division howled. Ignoring the single “violation
alleged,” it pointed out that an early paragraph in the complaint
alleged that the covenant was “a naked restraint of trade,”274 and
argued that the complaint “thus alleged a per se antitrust violation.”275
This is a strange way to run a railroad, by quite deliberately refraining
from alleging a per se violation and then arguing that in fact the
269. See Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association on the
“Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors” Issued in Draft on October 1,
1999, by the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice (Feb. 4, 2000 draft)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (commenting that the “safety
zones in the draft Guidelines are conservative,” which is understandable but problematic).
270. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 2002-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,836 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 28, 2002).
271. Complaint ¶ 42, at 12, LSL Biotechnologies (No. CV-00-529-TUC-RCC).
272. LSL Biotechnologies, 2002-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 94,824.
273. Id. at 94,827.
274. Complaint ¶ 6, at 3 (“The Restrictive Clause is a non-compete agreement between
actual or potential competitors. It was not reasonably necessary to any legitimate joint activity
between defendants and is so overbroad as to scope and unlimited as to time as to constitute a
naked restraint of trade . . . .”).
The Division also pointed to paragraph  7, which alleged that the clause “also violates
Section 1 . . . because it has harmed and will continue to harm American consumers by
unreasonably reducing competition to develop better seeds for fresh-market, long-shelf-life
tomatoes for sale in the United States.” Complaint ¶ 7, at 3.
275. Brief for Appellant United States of America at 17, LSL Biotechnologies, No. 02-16472
(9th Cir., argued Aug. 8, 2003).
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complaint implicitly had done so. If nothing else, the tonic of a
litigation defeat will help sharpen the Division’s thinking about what
kind of restraint is judged under what kind of standard.276
5. Interacting with Private Enforcement. Finally, the per se/rule
of reason story is one of healthy progression in part because the
agencies have not been lone rangers. The two Supreme Court cases
most important in setting forth the issues (Broadcast Music and
NCAA) were brought by private parties, and all of the important
opinions by Judges Bork, Easterbrook and Posner were issued in
private lawsuits. The Supreme Court’s California Dental Ass’n
opinion has now been interpreted by about a dozen judicial opinions,
all but one of which involved a private plaintiff.277 The government
has not had a monopoly on this body of law.
C. Summary
The point is not that all of the five features that marked the
agencies’ participation in the per se/rule of reason issue—must be
present for agency action to represent good shepherding of the
antitrust system. Indeed, for instance, appropriate agency action may
emphasize the unique advantage of one agency over the other
(criminal sanctions for the Antitrust Division; section 5 for the FTC).
The point rather is that these five features help explain why the
agencies’ work has been seen as legitimate and responsible even
though the work has failed to achieve an ultimate resolution.
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS
With respect both to the state enforcers and the federal agencies,
the appraisal is positive. Much is working. At the state level,
enforcers’ activities are almost always consistent with one or more of
276. More recent complaints, albeit ones filed to accompany consent judgments, have more
boldly pleaded per se violations. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Village Voice Media,
LLC, Civ. No. 1:03CV0164 (N.D. Ohio, complaint filed Jan. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200600/200673.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing
two causes of action: per se and rule of reason); Complaint, United States v. Mathworks, Inc.,
Civ. No. 02-888-A (E.D. Va., complaint filed June 21, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f11300/11369.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing
per se illegality or alternatively an unreasonable restraint of trade).
277. See, e.g., NHL Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n for the proposition that the rule of reason “employs a
burden-shifting framework”).
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their areas of consensus comparative advantage. At the federal level,
the antitrust agencies responsibly wrestle with challenging issues in
part by drawing on the strengths of both agencies, employing the
variety of available tools, addressing important questions while
supporting mainstream antitrust, litigating, and interfacing with
private enforcement.
Three recommendations emerge from the above review: (1)
Enforcers should not shy away from using the powers they have, (2)
they should address systemic issues in antitrust, and (3) they should
apologize less.
A. Continue to Use and Develop Existing Powers
The first point is simply that the antitrust agencies need to
continue to use and develop the powers they possess. The FTC
currently has what may be a modern record of competition matters in
active adjudication,278 which is taxing the agencies resources but
simultaneously developing its administrative litigation capabilities.
Those capabilities should also be used to challenge hospital
mergers.279
Nor should protests prevent the agencies from using the full
array of their powers. In the pending Schering-Plough case,280
respondents protested the citation by complaint counsel of a generic
drug study conducted during the pendency of the litigation.281 One
could imagine an argument that letting the Bureau of Competition
both litigate a case and conduct a study creates concerns about
impartiality and potential ex parte communications. The simple
278. See Adjudicative Proceedings, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/index.htm (last visited
Sept. 9, 2003) (listing current FTC adjudicative proceedings).
279. Cf. Timothy J. Muris, Everything Old Is New Again: Health Care and Competition in
the 21st Century, Prepared Remarks Before the 7th Annual Competition in Health Care Forum
19–20 (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murishealthcare
speech0211.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Chairman Muris said that past hospital
mergers should be challenged administratively, but, given the speed that modern FTC
administrative adjudication can achieve, there is no reason why certain planned hospital
mergers should not also be challenged administratively, at least where (as is common) the
merging hospitals do not plan substantial immediate integration of operations.
280. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 FTC LEXIS 40 (initial decision June 27,
2002).
281. Upsher-Smith’s Motion to Strike Complaint Counsel’s Reliance on the July 2002 FTC
Study, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. initial decision Nov. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/021121upshermotostrikegendrug.pdf (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
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answer is that Congress intended the FTC to be an expert body with a
variety of powers,282 and potential litigation awkwardness is not a
reason for it to refrain from advancing the public interest to the
fullest extent possible.283
The states, also, need to use existing powers. The sizes of state
antitrust offices vary substantially, from more than a dozen lawyers to
less than a single lawyer with many other responsibilities.284 This
disparity inevitably means that enforcement will vary from state to
state, with some states failing to engage in meaningful antitrust work.
Even a single half-time professional can promote competition policy
by participating in multistate enforcement that recovers ill-gotten
gains for state citizens, and that same part-timer can speak up for
competition values when other parts of the state government are
contemplating anticompetitive regulations.285 State regulation is
notoriously susceptible of being used for anticompetitive ends,286 and
a forceful voice for competition in an attorney general’s office could
be a powerful protector of consumers.287
Even the states with real antitrust departments could do much
more. Several states engage in regular scrutiny of the bidding
processes, but most states lack the resources to do this.288 Open-bid
282. See Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global
Marketplace, FTC Staff Report 1 (May 1996) (reviewing the Commission’s historic
investigatory mission).
283. Protecting respondents’ right to a fair trial also is essential, of course. In the cited case,
the FTC permitted reference to the study but allowed respondents extensive opportunity to
comment on it. Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum; Denying Motion
to Strike Reliance on FTC Study; and Permitting Each Party to File a Brief Addressing Cited
Facts Contained Therein, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 2003), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/030106ordgrntmotforleave.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
284. See Christine H. Rosso, State Attorney General’s Role in Waste Mergers, ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT NEWSLETTER, Winter 2001, at 17
(commenting on the discrepancies between various state attorneys general capacities).
285. It would be far better for state attorney generals to spend resources resisting
anticompetitive statutes and regulations than defending them, as occurred in TFWS, Inc. v.
Schaefer, 325 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 2003); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224–29 (6th Cir.
2002); and Swedenberg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 143–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
286. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
287. The importance of state attorney general competition advocacy has been recognized
from time to time, of course. See, e.g., 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, supra note 45, at 214–
15 (“We spent a tremendous amount of time . . . on competition advocacy.”)
288. Compare Susan Beth Farmer, Report from the National Ass’n of Attorneys General—
Dual Enforcement of State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 197, 198–99 (1989)
(“Local enforcement efforts include not only litigation, but bid monitoring, reviewing the rules
and regulations of state boards and agencies, and antitrust education for business and
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systems breed antitrust conspiracies, and governmental consumers
would benefit from regular attention to bidding.289 And
anticompetitive statutes and regulations are issued by large states as
well as small.290
B. Address Systemic Issues in the Antitrust System
Any law enforcement system needs continuous improvement,
and antitrust is no exception. The above review suggests several areas
of needed improvement.
1. NAAG Should Communicate Its Activities More Effectively.
State officials do a good job of making presentations, giving speeches,
and writing articles. What is missing is data. In a world in which
research is conducted on the web, NAAG needs a far better antitrust
website. Because facts are the best response to epithets, NAAG
should invest the resources needed to collect data about what state
attorneys general actually do in antitrust.291
NAAG officials also need to communicate more consistently
what state enforcers actually do. All too often, over the years, NAAG
speakers have understandably highlighted the new developments and
the glamorous activities while giving short shift to the smaller, local
matters and competition advocacy.292
purchasing agents.”), with Rosso, supra note 284, at 17 (noting that many antitrust programs are
extremely small).
289. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
290. See Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine, A Report from the Staff
of the Federal Trade Commission 7–9 (July 2003) (reviewing state restrictions on direct shipping
of wine), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf. This report is part of a
larger commission review of regulatory impediments to Internet competition. See FTC Public
Workshop: Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
291. The current chair of the Multistate Task Force, Patricia A. Conners, has been
persuaded of the importance of improved presentation of data. NAAG has embarked on “an
admittedly ambitious project of compiling in one place a comprehensive, statistical, and
substantive history of state antitrust enforcement, first in multistate matters and then eventually
in non-multistate matters.” Federal, State, International Enforcers Update Participants at ABA
Spring Meeting, 84 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 336, 338 (Apr. 11, 2003).
292. For a typical example, the otherwise unusually thorough 1997 review of state activities
mentions only two single-state actions. Roundtable Conference With Enforcement Officials, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 941 (1997) (statement of Kevin J. O’Connor, Chair, NAAG Multistate
Antitrust Task Force, Ass’t Attorney General, State of Wisconsin).
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2. The States and Agencies Should Keep a Long-Term
Perspective. Leadership in state and federal agencies regularly
changes, so time horizons may be short. This is unfortunate. Effective
leaders need to look to the long term. The problem is particularly
acute at the state level, where the benefits from short-sighted actions
may be enjoyed by a single state, but the costs are borne by all. At the
federal level as well, however, the system works only if top enforcers
think beyond their time in office.
At the state level, consider the consequences of the invocation of
antitrust authority for purposes unrelated to antitrust. The gains, if
any, accrue immediately to the attorney general doing the invoking.
The costs—which may be substantial if state antitrust enforcement is
discredited—are borne by the other states over the many years that
follow. It is in the collective interest of the NAAG antitrust team to
discourage misuse of antitrust authority, by bringing to bear whatever
moral suasion is possible.
Also at the state level, consider the tension created by differing
direct purchaser/indirect purchaser rules in federal and state law. This
will simply have to be resolved someday, and the states would be well
advised to work toward achieving a resolution. Until then, states
should avoid injustice by refraining from filing suit against that rare
defendant who really has paid the full private antitrust penalty, and
by structuring settlements so as to avoid prospective injustice.
At the federal level, the nature of antitrust litigation and
leadership terms at the agencies is such that cases filed under one set
of leaders are resolved under another.293 FTC Chairman Muris
authored the Commission’s opinion in In re Polygram Holding, Inc.294
and is expected to play a key role in In re Schering-Plough Corp.,295
both of which were filed without his participation. Conversely, the
Commission’s recent adjudicative complaints will likely be heard by a
293. Of the twenty-six Assistant Attorneys General who have served since legendary
Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold ended his five-year term in 1943, only one
(Thomas Kauper, 1972–1976) served as long as four years; most served less than three. See 3
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 8554 (June 25, 2003) (listing AAGs). Of the thirty-two FTC
commissioners appointed in the modern era starting in 1969 when Caspar Weinberger became
chairman, only six have served full seven-year terms, and no chairman has served longer than
Robert Pitofsky (1995–2001). See FTC Members—1915 to Present, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
9562 (Aug. 6, 2003) (listing Commissioners).
294. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,453 (July 24, 2003).
295. No. 9297 (F.T.C., complaint filed March 30, 2001 (In re Schering-Plough was filed
before Muris took office)).
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very different group of commissioners than issued them.296 Similarly,
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney
General (currently R. Hewitt Pate, President Bush’s second Assistant
Attorney General) is litigating cases filed by his predecessors
(principally Joel Klein, a Clinton appointee).297
Looking more directly at litigation, one small example of agency
action with long-term benefits is the deliberate hiring of outside
economics experts. Every time an agency litigates, there must be a
judgment whether to rely on inside or outside experts. The decision
turns on various factors, including cost, comparative expertise, and
the nature of the assignment.298 Hiring outside experts yields benefits
beyond the litigation in question. Without suggesting that pro-defense
consulting work biases academic research, one can suggest that it is
more healthy for consulting work to offer a mix of incentives and the
opportunity for academics to view issues from plaintiffs’ as well as
defendants’ perspectives. It is healthy to have NYU/Princeton
economist William J. Baumol (for the defense) confronted by
Stanford’s Joseph Stiglitz;299 to have Virginia’s Kenneth Elzinga and
MIT’s Richard Schmalensee going up against MIT’s Franklin
Fisher.300 Hiring academic economists has positive externalities that
should be part of the decision mix.
296. Commissioner Anthony recently stepped down. Commissioner Thompson’s term
expires September 26, 2003. Commissioner Swindle’s term expires a year later. See 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9562, at 16,452 (Aug. 6, 2003) (listing Commissioners).
297. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., No. 02-16472 (9th Cir., complaint
filed Sept. 15, 2000, by AAG Joel I. Klein, DOJ reply brief filed Nov. 20, 2002, by AAG Charles
James); United States v. AMR Corp., No. 01-3202 (10th Cir., complaint filed May 13, 1999, by
AAG Joel I. Klein, DOJ reply brief filed Mar. 19, 2002, by acting AAG R. Hewitt Pate); United
States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 02-6074(L) (2d Cir., complaint filed Oct. 7, 1998, by AAG Joel I.
Klein, DOJ brief filed June 28, 2002, by acting AAG R. Hewitt Pate).
298. Factors to consider generally in selecting economics experts are reviewed in George A.
Hay, The Economist as Expert Witness, in EXPERT WITNESSES 335, 346–59 (Faust F. Rossi ed.,
1991). In FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), the Commission used two
outside expert economists and an inside accounting expert, id. at 1070, 1089; in FTC v. H.J.
Heinz, Inc., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the Commission used an inside expert, id. at 724; E-
mail from Jonathan Baker, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University, to Stephen Calkins, Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School (Aug. 19,
2003, 09:26:00 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
299. See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1192 (D. Kan. 2001) (noting
testimony of experts), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
300. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting proffered
testimony); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust: New Economy, New Regime, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 283, 332 n.201 (2001) (naming chief economics experts).
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The antitrust system also could benefit from the cautiously
increased use of independent economics experts.301 Economics is
becoming increasingly central to antitrust liability and damages
disputes, and yet courts (let alone juries) are frequently at sea about
how to resolve battles of experts.302 A couple of antitrust cases have
relied upon neutral experts.303 Where a neutral expert is respected by
both sides, he or she could temper the extravagance of the testimony
of experts and help the court distinguish between points on which the
profession really agrees and on which it experiences disagreement. A
neutral expert is likely to be of greatest value on damages issues,
where small differences can yield large numerical consequences and
where there is less risk that testimony in one trial could embarrass
one academically or in subsequent litigation. It also could be of value
in proof of conspiracy cases, where the profession has something to
contribute; for that matter, if econometrics became central to any
case (rather than just supportive of other evidence), a neutral expert
might be of great value. On the other hand, it would be important to
structure the experts’ role carefully. Because the antitrust system
would benefit from appropriate use of independent experts, the
agencies should promote the welfare of that system by seeking an
opportunity to use such experts where use of an independent expert
would be helpful.
Other observations could be made, but the point is illustrated.
Both state and federal enforcers need to resist the incentives to think
short term and discipline themselves to work on building a foundation
from which others may build.
301. Cf. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 665 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Posner, J.) (“We recommend that the district judge use the power that Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence expressly confers upon him to appoint his own expert witness, rather than
leave himself and the jury completely at the mercy of the parties’ warring experts.”). Thanks to
Dr. Carl Shapiro for help thinking through these issues.
302. See id. (urging the appointment of independent experts); see also POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW, supra note 1, at 276–78 (advocating court appointments of neutral experts).
303. The best known example is New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321,
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (utilizing Dr. Alfred Kahn as an independent expert). Dr. Michael
Whinston has served as a neutral expert in a private CD price-fixing case presided over by
Judge J. Spencer Letts, Central District of California, that has not been finally resolved as of
this writing. In re Compact Disc Antitrust Litigation; Master Docket File No. 1216(JSL) (C.D.
Cal.); E-mail from Michael Whinston, Robert E. and Emily King Professor of Business
Institutions, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, to Stephen Calkins, Professor
of Law, Wayne State University (Sept. 3, 2003, 11:36:00 EST) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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3. Government Enforcers Should Be More Appreciative of
Private Litigation. The relationship between federal enforcers and
private attorneys general has always been uneasy. From time to time,
one senses resentment by government lawyers that “their good work”
may yield substantial private profit.304 This concern achieved concrete
form when, in In re First Databank Antitrust Litigation,305 the FTC
objected to the attorneys’ fees requested by private counsel in a
companion case to an FTC proceeding.306 That filing may have been
appropriate, because the Commission had unique knowledge about
its role and the role of private counsel.307 Also appropriate could be
filings where proposed relief is wholly inadequate or even harmful to
consumers.308 Were the Commission to consider more generally
objecting to fee awards in antitrust cases, however, it would risk
overreaching and going beyond agency’s expertise and proper role.
From time to time, of course, the agencies have been
appropriately supportive of private enforcement. A recent example
from the FTC’s consumer protection authority features an amicus
brief making clear that FTC and other agency regulations have not
preempted a field and barred private litigation.309 The agencies have
even expressed concern about overly aggressive use of arbitration
clauses and standing requirements that prevent private consumer
protection and antitrust plaintiffs from litigating the merits of their
304. Cf. Kauper, supra note 144, at 98 (“The relationship between the Division and private
plaintiffs was, and still is, an uneasy one.”).
305. 209 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2002).
306. See Federal Trade Commission’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Opposing Class Counsel’s Fee Application or,
in the Alternative, to Participate as Amicus Curiae, In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F.
Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 1:01CV008979 (TPJ)), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs/firstdatabank.pdf. The brief and the FTC’s concerns about class
actions more generally are discussed in Thomas B. Leary, The FTC and Class Actions, Remarks
at the Class Action Litigation Summit (June 26, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/classaction summit.htm#N_1 (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). For discussion of the delicate relationship between state and
private enforcers, see First, supra note 34, at 1039–40 (arguing that the relationship can be
complementary, but may be in some tension).
307. Leary, supra note 306.
308. Federal Trade Commission’s Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae, Erikson v.
Ameritech Corp., No. 99 CH 18873 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill., County Dep’t, Ch. Div. filed
Oct. 16, 2000, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/eriksonmemo.pdf.
309. Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and
Urging Reversal at 2, Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 282 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002)
(No. 00-15946) (recognizing “the importance of private enforcement actions as a vital additional
means of securing compliance”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs/nelsont.pdf.
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claims.310 Although these examples flow from previous
administrations, one hopes that antitrust agencies under varying
leaderships can appreciate the symbiotic role, well illustrated in the
per se/rule-of-reason saga, played by private enforcers.
C. There Should Be More Pride and Less Apologizing
At the federal level, there is no need to apologize about the
existence of two agencies. To be sure, other nations have not, and
cannot be expected to, follow America’s lead and have two antitrust
agencies. To be sure, there is duplication and inefficiency, but each
agency has special strengths. There will be periods when one agency,
or the other, is better able to attract and employ top talent; and the
contributions of the two agencies really can make for a better system.
At the state level, a disheartening moment occurred when the
Wall Street Journal attacked state attorneys general, and particularly
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, only to see
General Blumenthal respond defensively: “What separates us from
the so-called ‘private marauders of the trial bar’ is that we focus on
obtaining injunctive relief in court orders that change industry
practices . . . .”311 With all due respect, that is precisely where states’
comparative advantages do not lie. It is a good, noble, and important
thing to provide compensation to schools that have overpaid for milk,
to highway departments that have overpaid for roads, and to
consumers who have overpaid for contact lenses. The antitrust system
needs the deterrent value that sometimes states are best positioned to
provide.312
Thanks in no small part to their comparative advantages, states
play an essential role in the United States’s antitrust enforcement
system. There are times when states may be attracted by the
310. Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission in Support of the Real Parties in
Interest and in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus at 2–3, In re Am. Homestar
of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001) (No. 00-0722), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/
briefs/amerhomebrf.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
311. Richard Blumenthal, Letter to the Editor, What I Do for My “Clients,” the Citizens,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2002 at A15.
312. See Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 453, 466–67
(1999) (discussing awards secured by states as an important part the antitrust system). Thomas
Greene, chair of NAAG Multistate Task Force, explained that the major difference, when
federal and state enforcers work on the same alleged violation, “is the fact that we are going for
damages and relief for the actual victims of the conduct,” which “represents, I think, a fairly
effective partnership and a fairly effective division of labor.” Id.
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glamorous role of writing guidelines or filing amicus briefs.313
Diversity of views can be a good thing, struggling with challenging
issues may enhance the antitrust discussion, and at times states bring
an essential perspective to bear on an issue. It would be a pity were
the glamorous work to distract from critical enforcement efforts,
however. State attorneys general usually concentrate on their areas of
comparative advantage, and ordinary enforcement should be a source
of pride.
Even the Microsoft case is an exception that proves the rule. The
states stayed in the case to the end only because they were in it at the
beginning. They were in it at the beginning not because they were
anxious to embark on the project, but because they perceived a void
at the federal level.314 State perception of a lack of federal will is the
most common stimulus to expansive state activity.315 In contrast,
consider the crucial antitrust issue of the per se rule/rule of reason.
Here there are no NAAG guidelines, no NAAG enforcement
protocols, no aggressive NAAG litigation.316 NAAG has filed an
occasional amicus brief, but one senses confidence that federal
enforcers are doing legitimate, mainstream antitrust; NAAG is
content to leave that project principally to the federal government,
and concentrate on its areas of comparative advantage.
CONCLUSION
The renewed attention to state antitrust enforcement associated
with the Microsoft case is healthy, in part because it can contribute to
a better understanding of the states’ role. The case itself is the
exception. In fact, state attorneys general appropriately concentrate
313. NAAG Guidelines are collected at http://www.naag.org/issues/issueantitrust
protocols.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); NAAG amicus briefs are collected at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/amici.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
314. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 18, at 423 (identifying state interest as “originat[ing] in
the perceived weakness” of a decree negotiated by Microsoft and the Antitrust Division).
315. See, e.g., Cooperation and Competition among Antitrust Prosecutors: Recent
Developments in Antitrust Federalism, in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE, supra note 10,
at 401, 404–07 (Lloyd Constantine’s review of the energizing of state enforcers); James May,
The Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust
History, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 98–99 (1990) (“[I]n both the formative and modern eras, state
efforts intensified partly in response to the believed inadequacy of federal enforcement
efforts.”).
316. But cf. New York v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399, 411–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
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on building on their comparative advantages in delivering money to
consumers and in leveraging special understanding of local markets
and institutions. Federal antitrust enforcement is already widely
accepted, in part, as illustrated by the per se rule/rule-of-reason
struggle, because the federal agencies actively participate together,
using an array of tools, addressing important questions from a
mainstream, economics-based perspective, litigating, and interacting
with the private sector. To build for the future, enforcers should
continue to use their array of powers, they should address systemic
issues in the antitrust system, and they should apologize less. State
enforcers, in particular, need to be more clear about and proud of the
contributions they can make to the antitrust system, simply through
working where they have comparative advantages.
